

**AN OTTOMAN PEACE ATTEMPT AT THE HABSBURG COURT DURING
THE OTTOMAN-HOLY LEAGUE WAR: ZÜLFİKÂR EFENDİ IN VIENNA,
1688-1693**

A Master's Thesis

by

YASİR YILMAZ

**THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA**

January 2008

to my father, mother, sister and brother

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**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University**

by

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**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS**

in

**THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA**

January 2008

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.

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ABSTRACT

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DURING THE OTTOMAN-HOLY LEAGUE WAR: ZÜLFİKÂR EFENDİ
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January 2008

The visit of Zülfikar Efendi to the Habsburg court in 1688 was a milestone in Ottoman diplomatic history. The Ottoman system had its own diplomatic means and manners for centuries preceding the 1680s but these methods would function effectively only as long as the Ottomans were strong enough to ignore the strength of their rivals. An empire which for centuries had practiced unilateral and non-reciprocal policy making and implementation in diplomatic affairs was now seeking peace at the court of the Habsburgs, while welcoming Anglo-Dutch mediation.

This peace attempt marked the beginning of a new era for the Ottomans. From then on, they started considering the diplomatic rules and procedures followed by the European states in international arena, while this also marked the beginning of Ottomans' gradual acceptance of European means and manners in many other issues.

Key Words: Zülfikar Efendi, Ottoman Empire, Diplomacy, Habsburg Empire, Leopold I, Louis XIV, Poland, Venice, Seventeenth century, Europe.

ÖZET

OSMANLI-KUTSAL LİG SAVAŞI ESNASINDA BİR OSMANLI BARIŞ
GİRİŞİMİ: ZÜLFİKAR EFENDİ VİYANA'DA: 1688-1692

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Zülfikar Efendi'nin Habsburg sarayına 1688'de gerçekleştirdiği ziyaret Osmanlı diplomasi tarihinde bir dönüm noktasıydı. 1680ler öncesinde Osmanlı sisteminin bir takım kendi diplomatik yol ve yordamları vardı fakat bu metodlar ancak Osmanlılar rakiplerinin güçlerini önemsemeyecek kudrette oldukları sürece efektif olarak işleyebilirdi. Diplomatik meselelerde yıllarca tek taraflı ve karşılıksız bir siyaset mekanizması takip eden imparatorluk, şimdi Habsburg sarayında barış aramakla kalmıyor, İngiliz ve Felemenk aracılığını da hoş karşılıyordu.

Bu barış girişimi Osmanlılar için yeni bir dönemin başlangıcını simgeledi. O andan itibaren Sultanlar uluslararası arenada Avrupa devletleri tarafından takip edilen diplomatik kural ve prosedürleri dikkate almaya başladıkları gibi, bu aynı zamanda Osmanlıların diğer birçok konuda da Avrupanın usul ve prosedürlerini tedricen kabulünün başlangıcı oldu.

Key Words: Zülfikar Efendi, Ottoman İmparatorluğu, Diplomasi, Habsburg İmparatorluğu, Leopold I, Louis XIV, Polonya, Venedik, Diplomacy, Onyedinci Yüzyıl, Avrupa.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER II: OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY AND ITS PLACE IN EUROPE.....	8
2.1 Studies on Ottoman Diplomacy	10
2.2 Ottoman-European Interaction.....	16
2.3 Conceptualizing Zülfikar's Journey in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry.....	21
2.3.1 The Condition of the Ottomans fronts in Europe on the Eve of Zülfikar's Journey	22
CHAPTER III: AN OTTOMAN ENVOY IN HOFBURG	28
3.1 Ottomans and the Europeans Involved in the Peace Talks	28
3.1.1 A Retrospective of the Diplomatic Relations in the Last Quarter of the Seventeenth Century	26
3.1.2 Louis XIV's Determinant Role	33
3.2. Zülfikar's Departure, Arrival at Vienna and First Contacts	36
3.2.1 At the Habsburg Court	40
3.3 Peace Talks with Representatives	41
3.3.1 The Terms of the Ottomans	42
3.3.2 The Anglo-Dutch Mediation.....	43
3.3.3 Continuation of the Talks.....	43
3.4 Negotiations Come to a Deadlock	48
CHAPTER IV: STRUGGLE IN VAIN	51
4.1. Terms of the Emperor	51

4.2 Zülfikar's Demand to Leave.....	55
4.3 Terms of Venetians	56
4.4 Terms of the Poles	57
4.5 Zülfikar's Proposal to the Poles to Sign an Independent Treaty	59
4.6 Habsburgs Offer Leaving Balkan Territories	61
4.7 Ottoman Courier Mustafa Aga Goes to Edirne.....	62
4.8 The Changing Atmosphere of Europe and the Last Attempt for Peace	66
4.9 The Grand Viziership of Fazil Mustafa Pasha and His Meeting with English Mediator.....	69
4.10 The End of the Talks.....	71
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION.....	74
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 81
1. Primary Sources	81
2. Secondary Sources	82

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1670s and early 1680s, an Ottoman campaign into Central Europe was predictable and highly expected. In 1669, Ottomans had finally captured Candia (*Heraklion*) at Crete from the Venetians, after more than a twenty years long siege. During the following decade the Sultan's troops conducted new campaigns into their northern borders in Europe, aiming at conquest of the Polish King's southern possessions in Ukraine. At the treaties signed with the Poles in 1672 (Bucaş/Buczacz) and 1676 (Zurawno), the Ottomans secured acquisition of Podolia and Kamanice (Kamianetz).

With these two last attempts to restore their authority in the Mediterranean and Central Europe, Ottomans seemed to have fulfilled their strategic goals at that time. But Kara Mustafa Pasha's rise to the post of Grand Vizier in 1676 altered the vision of the Empire in the region. Since the Peace Treaty of Vasvar in 1664, where the Ottomans left the peace table as the gainful side although they lost the preceding battle in 1663 at St. Gotthard, Ottoman-Habsburg border in Hungary was overwhelmed by an anti-Habsburg nationalist movement. It was launched by Hungarian Protestants and Calvinists under the leadership of Imre Thököly. This malcontent community tried to approach to the Grand Vizier Fazil Ahmet Pasha

(1661-1676) to take his support. Fazil Ahmet Pasha, the commander of the army that lost the battle at St. Gotthard in 1663, had seen the territorial limits to the Ottoman central mechanism's area of influence, and therefore, did not intervene with the situation. But his successor Kara Mustafa Pasha, who was planning a glorious campaign to Vienna to increase his fame, did not hesitate to support the Hungarian malcontents. He not only disregarded the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I's (1658-1705) cooperation proposals in Hungary but also turned down the peace renewal request in 1681, when Leopold's envoy visited Istanbul.

Kara Mustafa Pasha laid siege on Vienna in 1683. It ended with heavy loss for the Ottomans. In 1684, owing much to the efforts of Pope Innocent XI (1676-1689), Leopold I signed an alliance treaty with the Venetians and Poles, and formed the Holy League against the Ottomans. The League, which was "little more than a coalition of recent victims of Ottoman resurgence"¹ in the Mediterranean and Central Europe, launched a grand attack over Ottoman territories from three quarters: Habsburgs marched from upper and northern Hungary as well as from Croatia; Venetians set their sights on recapturing Mora (*Morea*) while also advancing into Herzegovina from around Ragusa and Poles started conducting campaigns to regain Podolia and Kamanice.

During the first four years of the war until 1688/1689, the Holy League continuously drove back the Ottoman armies, except the northern front in Podolia, where the success of the Ottoman armies consisted of stopping the advance of the Polish forces, thanks to the efforts of the Crimean Khan there. At Habsburg and Venetian fronts the situation exacerbated so badly that one would expect a total breakdown of the Ottoman administration in the European provinces at the end of

¹ Charles Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 83.

the 1680s. Moreover, despite the loss of their one and a half century long possessions in Europe Ottomans were by no means showing signs of recovery. During 1686/1687 Habsburg armies had advanced into Serbia and Bosnian border almost without fighting. Meanwhile, at the Ottoman capital Sultan Mehmed IV (1648-1687) was dethroned and replaced with Süleyman III (1687-1691), Mehmed IV's brother.

The Ottoman Empire, which is known for its unilateral and non-reciprocal stance in the intermonarchial arena of the early modern world, decided dispatching a peace envoy to Vienna in 1688, on the pretext of reporting the new Sultan's rise to the Ottoman throne. Indeed, couriers were sent to all over the world to report the ascension of Süleyman III, including Yemen, India, Persia, France, England, and the Dutch Republic.² But as it was discovered soon, the envoy sent to Vienna was in fact a peace seeker disguised as a reporter of the new Sultan's ascension.

The palace first charged the chief treasurer (*baş-muhâsebeci*) Hamdi Efendi to go to Vienna. Hamdi Efendi replied that he couldn't cope with the situation and was ready to suffer the consequences for disobeying the order of the Sultan. His punishment was death.³ Then the Palace gave the duty of representing the Ottoman Sultan at the court of Leopold to Zülfikar, the deputy chief Imperial scribe (*reis'ul-küttâb vekili*).

Zülfikar grew up in Privy Council (*Hasoda*). He became the chief of the Imperial corps in 1669 and was discharged later to become first the Head of the Doorkeepers (*kapıcıbaşı*) of the Palace and then chief officer responsible for the record of daily expenditures (*ruzname-i evvel*). Afterwards he was given the rank of

² Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, Abdülkadir Özcan (ed.) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), 292.

³ "Ben bu kâr-ı düşvârın 'uhdesinden gelemem. Câ'iz ki, encâmında 'itaba mazhar olam." Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Zübde*, 292.

Sultan's inscriber (*nişancı*) and became deputy chief Imperial scribe.⁴ The sources put forth that before he was dispatched to Vienna, Zülfikar was given the rank of 'Pasha' and 'Beylerbeyi of Rumelia.'⁵ Nonetheless, the letter written by the Grand Vizier Bekri Mustafa Pasha and brought by Mustafa Aga from the capital to Vienna in October, 1689, names Zülfikar as 'Efendi.'⁶ Regardless of the cultural differences between the connotations of the words, 'Efendi' may be accepted as equal to the rank of 'Master' in English, while 'Pasha' is equal to the 'Lord.' A *Beylerbeyi* already had to possess the rank of 'Pasha' in order to be able occupy this post. If Zülfikar was given the rank of *Beylerbeyi* of Rumelia, this indirectly means Zülfikar possessed the rank of 'Pasha.' Despite the conflict between the primary and secondary sources, one may conclude that Zülfikar was probably given the rank of Pasha so that he would be welcomed with high respect during his representation at the Habsburg court. Moreover, assuming that the Ottoman Sultan would let himself represented at the Habsburg court by someone called 'Efendi,' which was widely used for educated gentleman in Ottoman society, doesn't conform to the facts of the Ottoman Imperial ideology, which will be explained below. However, during the narration, Zülfikar will be referred to as "Zülfikar Efendi" since the title of Pasha was only an interim one, valid only during his representation.

Zülfikar Efendi was never announced as a peace seeker in the name of the Sultan. From the Ottoman point of view, it would absolutely detract from the high image of the Ottomans. Instead, he was disguised as a courier charged with the duty

⁴ M. Alaadin Yalçınkaya, "Zülfikar Paşa," *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: YKY, 1999), 703-704; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî* Vol. 5 (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınlar, 1996); Franz Babinger, *Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları ve Eserleri*, trans. Coşkun Üçok (Ankara: 1982), 256-257.

⁵ "...Zülfikar Efendi ol işe me'mûren, Rumeli pâyesiyle hıl'at ilbâs olunup..." Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, *Zübde...*, 292.

⁶ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikâr Paşa'nın Viyana Sefâreti ve Esâreti: Cerîde-i Takrirât-i Zülfikâr Efendi [1099-1103 / 1688-1692]* (İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2007), 135.

of reporting Sultan Süleyman III's ascension. On July 10, 1688, Zülfikar Efendi departed from Istanbul with Alexander Mavrocordato, the palace dragoman since 1673.

Leopold I was feeling the pressure of all Christian Europe over him. Father Marco d'Aviano, counselor and spiritual guide to the Emperor, continued "pleading with Leopold to continue the Turkish war, to destroy the ancient enemy of the Church, and to remember always that his duty transcended the secular struggles of the western states,"⁷ Conditions stipulated by pressured Leopold were not the least bit tolerable to Zülfikar. The Emperor demanded abandonment of all Hungary and the territories associated with it. In a sense this meant that the Habsburgs laid claim to the entire Balkans.⁸ The demands of Poland and Venice similarly included heavy war compensations, territorial withdrawals, as well as several religious and commercial concessions. Zülfikar asserted the impracticality of the conditions. In short, negotiations had come to a standstill. The rest of Zülfikar's time in Vienna, approximately three years, was to be spent striving to obtain a permission to return home. He and his entourage were locked in a castle where German soldiers patrolled day and night. The Austrian statesmen, especially commissary general Antonio Carafa, continued paying visits to Zülfikar and his delegation but apparently the circumstances never prospered.

The current thesis is an attempt to examine Zülfikar's visit in its European diplomatic context. It is intended to reflect the peace talks in Vienna from Zülfikar's point of view, that is, of the Ottomans'.

⁷ John Stoye, *Marsigli's Europe 1680-1730 The Life and Times of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, Soldier and Virtuoso* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994), 71

⁸ For Habsburgs, "the Balkan lands were considered a legitimate part of the Hungarian crown." Ivan Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, 88.

Following the introduction in order to provide a background to the subject in its diplomatic context, Chapter II summarizes the studies on Ottoman diplomatic mind and how this diplomatic mind interacted with the Europeans during the early modern era. An evaluation of the limited existing studies on Ottoman diplomacy and how it functioned reveals that the main ground of the Ottoman international relations, which operated unilaterally and non-reciprocally until the end of the eighteenth century, was the imperial mind of the Ottomans. As one may notice in Chapter III and Chapter IV, Zülfikar's intransigent objection to terms of the Holy League members originated from nothing but this Imperial mind, which first and foremost observed the dignity of the Sultan and Empire. In Zülfikar's case it was confirmed at the cost of maintaining an exhaustive war.

The main primary source of the study is the account recorded by Zülfikar in Vienna under the title *Cerîde-i Takrirât-i Zülfikâr Efendi*. Two recent transcriptions of the study are published before the completion of the present thesis. The first is prepared by Mustafa Güler and published under the title *Zülfikar Paşa'nın Viyana Sefâreti ve Esâreti: Ceride-i Takrirât-i Zülfikar Efendi [1099-1103 / 1688-1692]*. A second transcription is prepared by Songül Çolak and published with the title *Viyana'da Osmanlı Diplomasisi (Zülfikar Paşa'nın Mükaleme Takriri)*. In the current study it's preferred to make use of the first publication not only because it was already published when the study started but also the transcription method applied by the editor allows the reader to follow the dates and paragraphs in the text easier. Moreover, this first publication includes images of the primary text, which allows the researcher to compare with the transcription when needed.

Having understood that the talks would end inconclusively, Zülfikar Efendi apparently ceased making proper records because the time flowed too quick and

with long intervals after the summer of 1689, when Zülfikar and his entourage began to ask permission papers to depart from Vienna. Therefore, except for several unremarkable details, it remains unknown to the researcher how the Ottoman representatives spent their captive-like last two years in Vienna.

The lost *muhimme* registers of 1681-1688 hinders one from following the early phases of the developments from the Ottoman Palace's point of view. Moreover, neither *Zübde-i Vekaiyât* by Defterdar Sari Mehmet Pasha, nor *Tarih-i Raşid*⁹ includes additional information about Zülfikar other than known to the researchers. At that point *Silahdar Tarihi* of Silahdar Mehmed Aga, who lived in the palace during the 1680s and 1690s, provided compensation. To reflect on the social condition of the Ottoman Empire at that time, Silahdar's text is employed now and again. Cengiz Orhonlu's *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin İskanı*, in which the author depicted social mobilization in the Empire during the 1691-1696 period mainly drawing on *muhimme* registers of the early 1690s, and Ahmet Refik's *Türk Hizmetinde Kral Tököli İmre*, transcriptions from the same period's *muhimme* registers, have also been helpful to clarify certain questions.

The subject was previously studied by Colin Heywood¹⁰ from the English aspect as a PhD thesis. Despite all the efforts, Heywood's thesis unfortunately never became available to the author of the current study. However, Colin Heywood was generous enough to send an unpublished forthcoming paper¹¹, which was originally delivered at University of London in June, 2007.

⁹ Tarih-i Raşit was already a copy of Zübde-i Vekaiyât. Defterdar Sari Mehmed Paşa, *Zübde*, XLVI.

¹⁰ C. J. Heywood, 'English Diplomacy between Austria and the Ottoman Empire in the War of the Sacra Liga, 1684-1699, with special reference to the period 1689-1699'. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of London, 1970.

¹¹ Colin Heywood, "Work in Progress?: William III's Ostpolitik after Forty Years," forthcoming article in *Dutch Crossing*, 2008.

CHAPTER II

OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY AND ITS PLACE IN EUROPE

The visit of Zülfikar Efendi to the Habsburg court in 1688 was a milestone in Ottoman diplomatic history. An empire which for centuries had practiced unilateral and non-reciprocal policy making and implementation in diplomatic affairs was now seeking peace at the court of the Habsburgs, while welcoming Anglo-Dutch mediation. To articulately contextualize this visit to its place in Ottoman diplomatic history as well as the Ottoman's to their place in early modern Europe, one first needs to shortly have a look at the origins of European States System¹ and the international law, that is, the set of rules that began to dominate international relations in Europe roughly from Peace of Westphalia (1648) on. It will facilitate understanding the following debate on what the diplomatic mind of the Ottomans meant and how and to what extent this mind interacted with European diplomacy within the framework of the general position of the Ottomans in the newly emerging European States System.

¹ For an analysis of the origins of European State System, see Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, Ad. 990-1992* (Studies in Social Discontinuity, Charles Tilly, ed.) (Oxford, Cambridge, Mass.: B. Blackwell: 1992), 161-191. An important analysis of the international system's background is in, F. S. Northedge, *The International Political System* (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), especially 23-32. Mainly drawing on pre-1914 period, the author summarizes the roots of the system.

It is true that events, formations or perceptions throughout the history are always products of a myriad of historical factors and parameters which function as preliminary elements. The main characteristic of these elements is that they never come into being all of a sudden but almost always as outcomes of long historical processes. There have definitely been a number of such noticeable commonly accepted rules, that is, elements, followed by the European monarchs in peace negotiations prior to Peace of Westphalia. As emphasized by many experts of international relations, however, these commonly accepted rules did not produce a distinctly characterized international society in Europe until the Peace of Westphalia,² save the fact that Peace of Westphalia itself again was only an immature stage in the long transformation period of the rules and procedures followed by the states in international relations throughout the centuries extending our time.

What the Peace of Westphalia did mark...was the emergence of an international society as distinct from a mere international system, the acceptance by states of rules and institutions binding on them in their relations with one another, and of a common interest in maintaining them.³

The foundations of the international law followed by this new international society in and after the seventeenth century were first laid by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Dutch jurist. His main work published in 1625, entitled *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* “obtained wide circulation and general recognition in the seventeenth century” and caused him to be called “Father of International Law.”⁴

² For a collection of the opinions about the place of Peace of Westphalia, see Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” *International Organization* 55, 2, Spring (2001): 251-287. This article as a whole is a revision and a critique of the widely-accepted interpretations regarding Peace of Westphalia.

³ Hedley Bull, “The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations,” in Hedley Bull, Benedict Anderson and Adam Roberts (eds.), *Hugo Grotius and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 65-93.

⁴ Amos S. Hershey, “History of International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia,” *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan., 1912): 30-69.

If not the most original treatise written on the law of nations up to that time it was certainly the most systematic, dealing with the whole range of relations among independent political communities, with peace as well as with war, ... assembling in a single work all the rules which were thought to exist bearing on these matters, and arranging them according to coherent principles.⁵

The main features of Grotius' view of international society were natural law, the universality of international society, individuals and non-state groups, and solidarism in the enforcement of rules.⁶ Having put forth for the first time by Grotius in a systematic way, these concepts have been pillars of the international law in Europe before too long, Peace of Westphalia being the first peace negotiation where these concepts were implemented by European nations.

Meanwhile the Ottoman Empire was following a different set of rules in diplomatic affairs, originated from the Islamic law of nations, which caused them to ignore the aforementioned diplomatic rules and procedures followed by the European nations. This Islamic law of nations

...as not based on mutual consent or reciprocity, but on their [Islamic states'] own interpretation of their political, moral and religious interest, as they regarded their principles of morality and religion superior to others.⁷

2.1 Studies on Ottoman Diplomacy

Most scholarship on the diplomatic history of the Ottoman Empire agree that prior to 1793, during the centuries of diplomatic interaction between the Europeans and Ottomans, the Ottoman Palace practiced an idiosyncratic interpretation of diplomacy. This approach thus assumes that the dispatch of the first permanent Ottoman ambassador, the assignment of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London in 1793,

⁵ Hedley Bull, "The Importance of Grotius," 74.

⁶ For an elaborate discussion of these features, see Hedley Bull, "The Importance of Grotius," 78-91.

⁷ Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1979), 45.

marked the beginning of a new era in Ottoman diplomatic history.⁸ Ottoman historians, regardless of what aspect of the Ottoman diplomacy they study and if they are critical or not about the Ottomans' understanding of diplomacy, are in consensus that the post-1793 period signified the beginning of a transformation from the preceding *ad hoc* diplomacy to the standards of modern European diplomacy, or in other words, from unilateralism to reciprocity.⁹

A broad periodization¹⁰ groups Turkish diplomatic history into two eras: Pre-Lausanne and post-Lausanne. The pre-Lausanne period is again divided into two in itself, 1793 being the landmark of shift from traditional standards of diplomacy to the European ones. The historiography on pre-1793 Ottoman diplomacy has so far focused on two principal factors that constructed the diplomatic mindset of the Ottomans. The first is the Ottomans' perspective of the world in Islamic terms in all matters. According to Islamic law, the world was divided into two realms: the *Dâr al Islam* (the abode of Islam) and *Dâr al-Harb* (the abode of the Infidels). This binary division theoretically assumes an incompatibility and disaccord between the two halves. This image of the world, irrespective of whether the Ottomans were ever enthusiastic about it, hindered the Ottoman's full integration into the non-Muslim world both psychologically and institutionally. This abstention from engaging in reciprocal relations of course had implications for diplomatic affairs. In

⁸An important study on the first Ottoman residential missions in Europe is Ercüment Kuran, *Avrupa'da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu: İlk Elçilerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1968).

⁹Several most important works on the subject are: J.C. Hurewitz, "Ottoman Diplomacy and The European state System," *MEJ*, 14 (1961): 147; Thomas Naff, "Ottoman Diplomatic Relations With Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns and Trends," in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (eds.), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, (Carbondale: 1977), 88; Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Seferleri ve Sefaretnameleri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), 14; A. Nuri Yurdusev, "The Ottoman Attitude Toward Diplomacy," in A. Nuri Yurdusev (ed.), *Ottoman Diplomacy Conventional or Unconventional* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 5; Bülent Arı, "Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period," *ibid.*, 37; A recent bibliographic study on Ottoman diplomatic history is Mehmed Alaaddin Yalçınkaya, "Kuruluştan Tanzimat'a Osmanlı Diplomasi Tarihi Literatürü," *TALİD*, 1 (2003): 423-489.

¹⁰Halil İnalcık, "Türk Diplomasi Tarihinin Sorunları," in *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), xv-xviii.

regard to diplomacy, this mental distance from the non-Muslim world in due course fostered the growth of a feeling of superiority over the Europeans and caused the Ottomans to ignore the assignment of residential missions to the lands of their so-called inferiors until the end of the eighteenth century. This attitude was conducive to the development of the second factor, that is, a set of diplomatic standards followed by the Ottomans until the late eighteenth century, which are accepted as the features of a long *ad hoc* period in Ottoman diplomacy.

An early periodization attempt on Ottoman diplomatic history was made by J. C. Hurewitz.¹¹ He argued that a rough periodization of post-1453 Ottoman diplomacy could include at least four phases. In this scheme, the first period extended till 1699 and was characterized by a unilateralism that allowed the presence of residential foreign missions in the Ottoman capital – and even in some other important cities – while ignoring the dispatch of permanent Ottoman ambassadors to foreign countries. The second period, beginning with the Treaty of Carlowitz existed until the rise of Selim III (1789-1807) to the Ottoman throne, or more precisely, until the sending of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London in 1793, and “compelled the Sultans to negotiate” and paved the way for the “unilateralism of a contracting empire.” With Selim III, Ottomans now were a participant, if not a constituent, of reciprocal diplomacy and thus entered the third period of their diplomatic relations. Following the 1820s, during the fourth and the final period, Ottoman bureaucrats were striving to internalize the European standards of diplomacy so as to fully integrate their state machinery into the European state system.

This periodization has never been challenged by alternative explanations and may in essence be assumed as an outline of the Ottoman diplomatic history. Indeed,

¹¹ J.C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy,” 145.

explaining the transformation of an historical fact with periodizations based on turning points of history is noticeably arbitrary and impedes conceptualization of the big picture that particularly holds importance in the construction of that fact.¹² Yet, the Peace Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 or Yusuf Agah Efendi's mission to London in 1793, as evidences of Ottoman diplomacy's adjustment to changing times, definitely marked critical points in Ottoman diplomatic history. Therefore, they might well represent ends and beginnings of new periods in Ottoman diplomacy. To better conceptualize the Ottoman diplomatic mind, however, the Ottoman historiography needs further theoretical and empirical contributions. Unfortunately, despite being an extension of political history, and thus having an advantage to outline the course of events that formed the Ottoman diplomatic mindset, the field of Ottoman diplomatic history still lacks studies delineating - in a collective fashion - the metamorphosis of Ottoman diplomatic mentality. One may argue that, until recently, the fate of the studies on the political history of the Ottomans has had indirect negative influence on the improvement of diplomatic studies. As emphasized by Gökhan Çetinsaya,¹³ studies on political history of the Ottoman Empire have been under the sway of ideological contentions which, as a fact, has hindered the flourishing of politically querying studies. Indeed, the scarcity of research on Ottoman political mentality is evidence to that. It is likely that the lack of detailed surveys exhaustively incorporating archival findings with existing secondary literature on political mind will continue to restrain authenticated research on the diplomatic mind.

¹² One may argue, however, that they facilitate understanding historical facts independently.

¹³ Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Türkiye'de Siyaset Tarihçiliğinin Yükselmeden Düşüşü: Gök Ekini Bıçmış Gibi," *TALİD*, 1 (2003): 7-15.

The most recent major contribution to the field has been *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?*¹⁴ The book is composed of articles which delve into the matters of Ottoman diplomacy and clarify certain points pertaining to the subject. A. Nuri Yurdusev¹⁵ attempts to shed new light on the theoretical debates about the constituents of the Ottoman diplomatic mindset. In his article, Yurdusev firstly encapsulates the features of European diplomacy, which transformed into an institutionalized set of rules in the fifteenth century Italy with the first prototypes of resident embassies. He then explains how Islamic law was the principal component of Ottoman polity, and stresses that the Ottoman mind was pragmatic and they “pragmatically interpreted the precepts of Islam especially with regard to external affairs.”¹⁶ Subsequently, to clarify his claim that the Ottoman Empire - as an imperial system – was different from the other early modern European Empires, Yurdusev remarks:

The modern European colonial empires were not really imperial systems. They were just colonial empires, having territorially consolidated states in their metropolitan area in Europe and colonies overseas. As an imperial system, the Ottoman Empire had all the notions and, perhaps, pretensions of universalism and self-sufficiency. When one examines the Ottoman attitude towards the emerging European states and diplomacy, the imperial character of the Ottomans must not be forgotten. The source of the Ottoman sense of superiority was partly Islam but more its imperial nature.¹⁷

Yurdusev concludes that the aforementioned two factors, namely, Islam and more importantly the imperial nature of the Ottoman Empire, were the main elements of the Ottoman point of view towards Europe. He continues by stating that, contrary to many assumptions, even though the Ottomans’ feeling of

¹⁴ A. Nuri Yurdusev (ed.), *Ottoman Diplomacy Conventional or Unconventional* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2003)

¹⁵ A. Nuri Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude...,” 5-35;

¹⁶ A. Nuri Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude,” 15. The idea actually echoes debates among historians on the interpretation of *ghaza* by the Ottomans. As Halil İnalcık asserted earlier, the *ghaza* was not only an Islamic motivation for the Ottomans but was also a source of prestige in Islamic world, thus, had a pragmatic aspect. Halil İnalcık, “The Rise of the Ottoman Empire,” in M.A. Cook (ed.), *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 31.

¹⁷ A. Nuri Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude,” 21.

superiority fostered the emergence and prolongation of an intrinsically unilateral understanding of diplomacy- first and foremost visible in their unwillingness to send residential missions to Europe –Ottomans were never disjointed from the European State System of the time. In other words, as the empirical data confirms, the Ottoman political and diplomatic machinery was an active and intervening component of the European State System.¹⁸

Bülent Arı's article analyses the existing knowledge on Ottoman diplomacy with archival evidence. The article provides a descriptive survey of the concepts and facts pertaining to the traditional and ceremonial procedures¹⁹ followed by the Ottoman central mechanism during the *ad hoc* period, namely, the period that ended in 1793. Arı's evaluation that "the Ottomans created their own method of diplomacy while respecting the pillars of Islam"²⁰ concurs with Yurdusev's assumption on the idiosyncrasy of the Ottoman Islamic interpretation. Likewise, the following comment of Bülent Arı supports Yurdusev's stress on the imperial nature of the Ottoman Empire:

As an acknowledgement of her superiority, the Ottoman government conducted a unilateral system of diplomacy with the European states. Sending an ambassador to a foreign country, particular to the enemy, was considered as a sign of inferiority.²¹

An important reference to Arı should be made on his query about why the Ottomans eventually agreed to become a part of the European diplomatic network. He expresses that from the mid-eighteenth century on successive Russian victories

¹⁸ A. Nuri Yurdusev, "The Ottoman Attitude," 21-25. The Ottoman impact on the formation of European State System has been an independent issue in Ottoman historiography. In his article Yurdusev intelligently integrates the subject with the facts of Ottoman diplomacy. The current chapter touches the subject in the next pages in reference to the various aspects of the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry.

¹⁹ An earlier short descriptive study on the diplomatic procedures followed by the Ottomans is in Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri*, 23-42.

²⁰ Bülent Arı, "Early Ottoman Diplomacy," 37.

²¹ Bülent Arı, "Early Ottoman Diplomacy," 44.

over the Ottomans left the floundering Ottoman central mechanism no alternative except to seek support in Europe against this northern enemy.²²

A third article by G. R. Berridge provides a solid argument to consolidate the past debates about the nonreciprocal and unilateral nature of Ottoman diplomacy which was allegedly independent from the European State System. The article, as claimed by its author, is a counterargument against the conviction that “the diplomatic links that connected the Ottoman Empire to Europe in the early modern Europe were weak and unsatisfactory.”²³ Berridge claims that the Ottoman Empire that refrained from dispatching residential ambassadors “until the end of the eighteenth century was by no means entirely unrepresented beyond the Empire’s fluctuating borders.”²⁴ Residents of Europe, merchants, couriers and administrators in European provinces of the Empire as well as special envoys, all were sources that helped Ottomans to remain in communication with Europe.²⁵ Having summarized the advantages enjoyed both by the Ottomans and the Europeans, Berridge concludes that “as a result, it seems clear that there was a degree of diplomatic intercourse between the Ottoman Empire and the major powers of Europe,”²⁶ a remark that should be scrutinized in order to strengthen our understanding of the late seventeenth century Ottoman world.

2.2 Ottoman-European Interaction

The opinion that politics were confined to relatively smaller territories prior to the sixteenth century and the outcomes of political decisions mainly affected only

²² Bülent Ari, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy,” 59.

²³ G. R. Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III,” in A. Nuri Yurdusev (ed.), *Ottoman Diplomacy*, 114.

²⁴ G. R. Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration,” 115.

²⁵ G. R. Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration,” 115-117.

²⁶ G. R. Berridge, “Diplomatic Integration,” 124.

the immediate area is a tenuous one. The transformation of inter-ruler conflicts into inter-continental ones, especially during and after the sixteenth century, brought about a more complex network of relations between the rulers, without diminishing the utility of alliances with bordering, but less powerful princes. The emergence of Ottoman-Habsburg relations in East Central Europe in the early sixteenth century coincided with, and perhaps marked, the onset of an era full of inter-monarchial disagreements and contentions, which were to dominate European politics. It is well established that from 1570 to 1683 Ottomans achieved the apex of their geographic expansion, which concurrently brought them to the limits of 'action radius.'²⁷ However, when the trajectory of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into the early eighteenth century is observed, it is quite noticeable that the notorious Ottoman war machine continued to pose the most dangerous threat to some of its European counterparts, while also being a reliable ally to others. That is to say, it was still the most significant element of the "European state system."

Contrary to the long assumed institutionally disjointed and traditionally unconcerned image of Ottoman relations with the European powers prior to the end of the eighteenth century, the above discussion displaying the diplomatic dynamism of the Empire strengthens both old and new ideas about the prevailing interaction between the Ottoman and European worlds. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire, during its presence as a political entity, was an essential determinant on many aspects of European history.

Putting relatively significant earlier periods aside, the interaction between the Ottomans and Europeans, in all the senses of the word, started at the end of the

²⁷ Gabor Agoston, "The Ottoman," 287.

fifteenth century, when the Italian wars erupted in the Continent,²⁸ and then passed through its most important phase during the simultaneous rules of Süleyman the Lawgiver (1520-1566) and Charles V (1519-1556). Indeed, their ascension to two most significant thrones of the time in Europe opened another chapter in the rivalry of the two worlds, i.e., Ottoman and European.²⁹ Süleyman's direct intervention in European affairs can be traced back to the campaign of 1526, launched upon the request of Francis I of France,³⁰ who was captured by Charles V at the Battle of Pavia (February 25, 1525). Süleyman's foreign policy benefited from the religious contentions in the Continent especially in Central Europe and the formation of an environment which allowed the establishment of Protestant, Calvinist and Lutheran states.³¹ "It is convincingly argued that Ottoman pressure on the Habsburgs was an

²⁸ "Ottomans became an active part in the second stage of the Italian wars and there was a moment when the Western contenders for Italy saw that the balance of power was lost in the favor of the Sultan." Halil İnalcık, "The Turkish Impact On The Development of Modern Europe," in Kemal Karpat (ed.), *The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 51.

²⁹ One may argue that the significance of the opposition of Süleyman to Charles V stemmed from the symbolism Süleyman adapted in his epithets in addition to a quasi-crown helmet, which he took with him in the 1532 campaign, referring to his desire for the Holy Roman Emperorship. For the symbolism applied by Süleyman in his epithets, see Halil İnalcık, "State, Sovereignty and Law during the Reign of Süleyman," in H. İnalcık and C. Kafadar, (eds.), *Süleyman the Second and his Time* (Istanbul: ISIS, 1993), 59-92. A well-detailed survey of Süleyman's helmet is given in Gülru Necipoğlu, "Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry" in *ibid.*, 163-194.

³⁰ Halil İnalcık, *Turkey and Europe in History* (Istanbul: Eren, 2006), 156.

³¹ The influence of the Ottomans on the survival and establishment of Protestantism, Calvinism and Lutheranism, that is on early modern 'heresies' from the Papal point of view, has been another noticable debate among the historians. As early as 1950s Stephen A. Fischer-Galati published an article and a book about the subject, in which he tried to clarify then already known effect of the Ottomans on German Reformation. Stephan A. Fischer-Galati, *Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521-1555* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). This book was an expanded version of an earlier article by the author: Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, "Ottoman Imperialism and the Lutheran Struggle for Recognition in Germany, 1520-1529," *Church History*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1954), 46-67. Both Fischer-Galati's study, despite critiques on his book, and following examinations of the diets gathered during the sixteenth century in German principalities and Transylvania, established as a fact that the new religious interpretations excessively benefited from the constant threat posed by the Ottomans on the territorial integrity of Central Europe. C. Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus* (New York: New York University Press, 1972). Kortepeter's study was principally focused on Ottoman methods of administration over to the vassal states of the Sultan. Nevertheless, during his narration – although unsystematically scattered in the chapters, he provides details about how the Ottomans benefited from sectarian contentions in Europe. Two relatively more recent articles made use of Hungarian and German sources and partially agreed that, in one way or another, new religious interpretations in Europe benefited from the Ottoman existence in the region. Günther R. Burkert, "Protestantism and Defence of Liberties in the Austrian Lands under Ferdinand I," in R. J. W. Evans and T. V. Thomas (eds.), *Crown, Church*

important factor in the extension of Protestantism in Europe.”³² At the end of Süleyman’s reign,³³ which witnessed the demise of two brothers from the House of Habsburg, that is, Charles V and Ferdinand, the significance of Ottomans relations with the Austrian Habsburgs subordinated any other rivalry within the Ottoman possessions.³⁴

Daniel Goffman, too, states that as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Ottomans were a diplomatic element, may be the center, of the European system:

Dutch, English, French and Venetian ambassadors resided in Istanbul, and the Ottomans became part – perhaps even the core – of the diplomatic system that had arisen out of Italy in the fifteen and sixteenth centuries.³⁵

Goffman makes an interesting remark about the Ottomans’ social integration with Europe in the seventeenth century, prior to the manifest institutional integration at the end of the eighteenth century. He claims that the integration process in fact accelerated in the seventeenth century but since Ottomans waited the end of the eighteenth century to join the European system institutionally, this process was not visible:

In the Ottoman instance, the advance toward integration in fact quickened during the seventeenth century. This circumstance has not often been noted, perhaps because it was not reflected in the policies of the Ottoman state,

and Estates: Central European Politics in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 58-69; László Makkai, “The Crown and the Diets of Hungary and Transylvania in the Sixteenth Century,” *ibid.*, 80-91. Another article later revealed that the Ottoman, in fact, were “aware of the religious divisions in western Christianity, even before the Protestants were militarily important. Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “An Ottoman Report About Martin Luther and the Emperor: New Evidence of the Ottoman Interest In The Protestant Challenge to the Power of Charles V,” *Turcica*, 28 (1996), 299-318.

³² Halil İnalcık, “The Turkish Impact...,” 53. Ottoman influence was not limited to wars and religious movements. Halil İnalcık also provided evidence pertaining to the economic relations. See 53-58. In a very recent study, the author shed new light on many aspects of the mutual influence between the Ottomans and the Europeans. Halil İnalcık, *Turkey and Europe in History* (Istanbul: Eren, 2006), 140-194.

³³ A recent survey of Süleyman II’s rule is Feridun Emecen, “Sultan Süleyman Çağı ve Cihan Devleti,” *Türkler* Vol 9 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 501-520.

³⁴ Nicolae Iorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi* Vol. 3 (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005), 81-82.

³⁵ Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and the Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 19-20.

which sought to “reform” itself to past days of glory and did not begin emulating innovations in the rest of Europe until the following century. Rather than the government assuming the lead, Ottoman subjects and foreigners residing in Mediterranean port cities and along Balkan borderlands intensified their dialogues and carved out commercial and social enclaves along the Ottoman frontiers.³⁶

The author very recently articulated his opinions in a new article³⁷ regarding the Ottoman diplomacy and its significant place within early modern Europe. Goffman claims that the peculiarities in the governing policy of the Ottomans allowed foreign ambassadors and subjects to settle in the Empire. Moreover the Sultans gave the former legal jurisdiction rights over the latter, that is, over their subjects:

In the century or so after the Protestant Reformation, virtually all of Western Europe adopted the hopeful fantasy of *cuius regio eius religio* – the idea that the ruler’s religion must also be the religion of her or his subjects. In this climate, the display of heretical worship that most envoys demanded and most states proscribed paralyzed diplomatic relations between Catholic and Protestant states. Only in the seventeenth century did the concept of extra-territoriality help resolve this dilemma. For the Ottomans, though, there never was such an issue. Beginning in the fifteenth century, not only did consul have legal jurisdiction over his “nation,” but each legate also had a church or chapel where he, his staff, and his community could worship freely...No other European state favored foreigners with such sweeping autonomy until long after the religious wars of the sixteenth century had helped shatter the idea of universal law. Thereafter, of course, the invention became and has remained an axiom of international diplomacy. Surely in Ottoman accommodation of foreign settlers we find an antecedent, and perhaps even a precedent, for such extra-territoriality.³⁸

Another illuminating article by Gabor Agoston³⁹ provides evidence for the aforementioned remarks of the Ottoman historians about how the Ottoman administrative system efficiently gathered information on Europeans. Ambassadors in Istanbul and their interpreters, *beylerbeyis* and *sancakbeyis* in the provinces,

³⁶ Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire*, 18-19. Berridge had emphasized the same point. See footnote 17.

³⁷ Daniel Goffman, “Negotiating with the Renaissance state: the Ottoman Empire and the new diplomacy,” in Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman (eds.), *The Early Modern Ottomans, Remapping the Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 61-74.

³⁸ Daniel Goffman, “Negotiating with the Renaissance state,” 72-73.

³⁹ Gabor Agoston, “Information, ideology, and limits of imperial policy: Ottoman grand strategy in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry,” in *ibid.*, 75-103.

rulers of vassal principalities as well as agents, envoys and spies in Europe,⁴⁰ all functioned as intelligence sources for the Ottomans and helped the Sultans stay up-to-date about the circumstances in Europe.

2.3 Conceptualizing Zülfikar's Journey in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry

Where do we locate the visit of Zülfikar's journey in this picture? For a better answer, one needs to sum up the outcomes. The Ottoman imperial system was long accepted as a disjointed and inactive component of the contemporary European world of its time. The fallacy behind the thought was an assumption based on the Islamic division of the world between Muslim and non-Muslim lands, according to which a conflict between *Dâr al Islam* (the abode of Islam) and *Dâr al-Harb* (the abode of the Infidels) was supposedly destined to take place. The Quranic teaching commands that the faithful lean towards peace if the enemy does the same.⁴¹ This aside, the Ottomans, as emphasized by specialists of Ottoman history,⁴² had their idiosyncratic interpretation of Islamic law, which primarily observed pragmatism for the state. For long years, the Sultans welcomed the presence of non-Muslims in their lands because, in addition to what Islam instructed, the state simply benefited from their presence. For nearly three centuries before 1793, foreign residential missions to the Ottoman lands prevailed. However, the Sultans never considered appointing permanent representatives in foreign countries to collect information on European diplomatic affairs since non-Muslim subjects were efficiently functioning as elements of the Ottoman diplomatic system. That is to say, the Ottoman system

⁴⁰ Gabor Agoston, "Information, ideology, and limits," 82-92.

⁴¹ "And if they (the enemies) incline to peace, incline to it also and put your trust in God. Surely, He is the All-Hearing, the All-Knowing." *The Holy Quran*, Surah Anfal (The Gains of War), 61.

⁴² Inalcik, Goffman, Yurdusev, Agoston and Ari are unanimous on the issue.

developed its own diplomatic means and manners. Such a system would operate effectively only as long as the Ottomans were strong enough to ignore the strength of their rivals. Zülfikar was a representative of the summarized diplomatic mind.

2.3.1 The Condition of the Ottomans fronts in Europe on the Eve of Zülfikar's Journey

What compelled the Ottomans to seek peace at the Habsburg court in 1688 were the dire straits they faced in the midst of a war fought on three different fronts. During the 1660s and 1670s Hungary was restless with a desire for independence. Nicholas Zrinyi and Count Imre Thököly, the two most important leaders of the nationalist movement, initiated an anti-Habsburg and anti-Catholic movement. In the 1660s and 1670s they appealed to the former Grand Vizier Fazil Ahmed Pasha (1661-1676), requesting his assistance. Fazil Ahmet Pasha, who tasted defeat against the Habsburgs at St. Gotthard in 1663 and probably saw the limits of military intervention to Central Europe from Istanbul, ignored the fomentations in Hungary and remained indifferent to these developments. Kara Mustafa Pasha, who took over the post of Grand Vizier in 1676 after Fazil Ahmed Pasha's death, was a harsh person, dreaming glorious triumphs. He fully benefited from Sultan Mehmed IV's detachment from state affairs and determined the fate of the Ottomans to a great extent for the rest of their existence in this stage of history. He fixed his eyes on Vienna and, on the pretext of aforesaid agitations in Hungary, did not hesitate to launch a very large scale campaign into Hungary that ended with the siege laid on the Habsburg capital, again by the Turks.⁴³

⁴³ In 1683, the determining factor on the campaign decision more than anything was the enthusiasm and resoluteness of the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa (1676-1683) to realize a glorious victory. In Ottoman and Central European historiography, the motivations of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha in the 1683 campaign are still a complex question and yet to be answered panoptically. Historians

The siege of Vienna concluded with the complete failure of the Ottomans. It became a rallying cry for nations waiting to take their revenge from the Ottomans, and paved the way for the formation of a Holy League against the Ottomans, owing much to the support of the Pope. Poles, who lost a number of strongholds in Podolia to the Sultan in the 1670s and whose peace seeking envoy was humiliated at the Ottoman capital afterwards by Kara Mustafa Pasha, and Venice, which fought to

offered a number of answers taking into account both internal and external various factors from the viewpoint of the Ottoman Empire, not excluding the personal ambitions of the Grand Vizier. Traditionally, Kara Mustafa Pasha is considered to be the culprit of the outcomes of 1683, since he was the mastermind behind this vast mobilization of Ottoman military resources. Two early Ottoman historians, Joseph Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall and Nicolae Iorga, offered two different views. The former had no doubt that Kara Mustafa Pasha was planning to establish a Muslim Empire in the West, Vienna being the capital city and he himself the Sultan; while the latter argued that the operation was simply a reflection of the Ottoman tradition regenerated by first two Köprülü viziers, according to which the subjects should have been fed with warfare each year and the Sultan would celebrate the fruits of the campaigns during falls and springs. Kara Mustafa Pasha, usually portrayed as one of the most arduous and demanding Grand Viziers of the Empire, completely suited both of these explanations. According to Silahdar, as the march towards Belgrade started, Kara Mustafa's clerk Mustafa fueled his already passionate master by encouraging him to turn towards the Austrian capital, thus playing a role in the Grand Vizier's decision. Silahdar noted that the clerk, allegedly a French convert, stated that with such a vast force it would be pointless to march onto Győr, the original target of the expedition and a citadel already surrounded by Ottoman possessions. Iorga, *Osmanlı*, Vol. 4, 165. Mustafa said to his master that if he captured Vienna, his power would be equal to that of Persian King Khosrow I (also known as Anushiravan the Just, 531-579), a richness and authority possessed only by a handful of rulers throughout the history. He continued that, once Vienna was taken, the German princes would come under his rule; he would expand his sovereignty to the Western spheres of Germany and would provide another income source to Istanbul's treasury equal to that of Egypt. Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Silahdar Tarihi* Vol. 2 (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1928), 18-19. It would be quite right to emphasize that a Grand Vizier, especially one as bold as Kara Mustafa Pasha, who was already seeking an opportunity to gain reputation and respect, would not determine the destination of a campaign in regard to a clerk's words. But what he put into practice in the end conforms to the words of his clerk, which helps one to understand Kara Mustafa Pasha's psychology before the siege. Other historians argue that the financial crisis led the Grand Vizier into this campaign. For those, the proof lies in Kara Mustafa's unwillingness to capture the city with direct march, lest the soldiers sack its treasuries after bringing down its already weakened ramparts. Interestingly, there were even views reducing the reason to a simpler issue by arguing that the Grand Vizier was in love with a princess. Both views in: Ernst Petrisch, "Avusturya'nın Bakış Açısından Kara Mustafa Paşa" in *Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa Uluslararası Sempozyumu 08-11 Haziran 2000*, (Ankara: Merzifon Vakfı Yayınları, 2000), 91-99. Whatever the reason, the campaign symbolized the Ottoman devotedness to strengthen their domination in East-Central Europe and had a strategic significance on a line that spread from Dalmatia to Podolia over Transylvania, and, actually, it served as a perfect example of how one statesman can change an empire's destiny. But it should also be evaluated within the context of larger trends in military and political history. In a very long process that might be expanded well into the mid-twentieth century, gaining new territories and geographically expanding a state's area of influence and authority has been a major goal of statesmen. Kara Mustafa Pasha, in the end, was a character of the early modern world, where war and valor on the battlefield for any nation was both a usual and a respectable way of expressing their strategies and policies. At a time when the entire Europe was under pressure of the ambitions of monarchs and rulers of all sizes, one cannot blame Kara Mustafa Pasha because of his courage and eagerness to have an attempt at testing the limits of the Ottoman territorial expansion. Nonetheless, the consequence of the war proved once more that courage and eagerness are not the only prerequisites of victory.

defend Crete against the Ottomans but failed in 1669 after probably the longest siege of history, both joined Leopold in March 1684⁴⁴ in an agreement long dreamed of by Pope Innocent XII.⁴⁵

The first resistance point against the Habsburg armies was northern Hungary. The Habsburg's primary objective in the early years of the war was capturing this region, centered at the Ottoman stronghold Budin (*Buda*). By the end of 1685, Habsburgs took Uyvar and, in 1686, Budin, after several futile attempts to capture the latter during the previous three years. From 1686 on, coordinating and actualizing the campaigns was a very difficult task for the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the scarcity caused by incessant warfare, famines ruined the physical well-being of the people, who resorted to a diet of wild plants and rinds.⁴⁶

The next two years, 1687 and 1688, brought the Ottoman presence in Hungary to an end. The Habsburg allied army defeated the Ottoman troops along all of the battlefronts in Hungary and made their way towards the south from three points: Northern Hungary, Buda, and Croatia.

In 1687, a series of events eventually brought Mehmet IV's thirty-nine years of rule to an end.⁴⁷ On the eve of 1687 the imperial treasury was completely empty.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Attempts of the Pope were not limited to these. Right after the siege, in November 1683, the Pope had also mentioned to a French ambassador in Rome his plans to divide the Ottoman Empire and tried to gain French support too. Ivan Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, 42. France never joined the Holy League. Moreover, two envoys from Europe were sent to Persia to request their support by declaring war on the Ottomans in eastern Anatolia. This attempt also proved futile. In fact, Polish and Austrian diplomats had already started arguing – and disagreeing – on the future of Transylvanian principalities before they launched the united offensive. Nicolae Iorga, *Osmanlı Tarihi* Vol. 4 (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005), 178-179.

⁴⁵ Charles Ingrao claims that the Pope mobilized a variety of sources all over the continent “to finance” this unity “what could justly be termed as the last great crusade,” Charles Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy...*, 78. In fact, for the Ottomans –in regard to above explained pragmatism and the personal motivations of Kara Mustafa Pasha- one can argue that the Ottomans motivations were not primarily religious. Correspondingly, in light of the personal ambitions of Leopold to regain Hungarian territories, one can assume that pragmatic goals of the League had priority in terms of *realpolitik* as opposed to the Crusades of the previous centuries. Nicolae Iorga, *Osmanlı*, Vol 4, 177.

⁴⁶ Silahdar, *Silahdar*, Vol 2, 243-44.

⁴⁷ Mehmed IV had ruled concurrently with two of the most remarkable sovereigns of European history: Louis XIV of France and Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I. In personality, Sultan Mehmet

There was no money to afford the new year's campaigns. This induced Mehmet IV and the Grand Vizier to resort to several unconventional sources of finance. In addition to demanding imposition of war (*imdâdiye*) from the *'ulema* and taking money from the orphan's coffer, the incomes of some imperial and stipendiary fiefs were allocated to the imperial treasury.⁴⁹ The *'ulema*'s reaction to this arrangement gave stimulus to the deposition process of Mehmet IV.⁵⁰ During the same year, the Grand Vizier's incapability of administrating the army resulted in a heavy loss at Mohac, on August 12, 1687.⁵¹

The withdrawal of the army from southern Hungary in 1687, an act which left the battlefield entirely vulnerable, ended with the deposition of Sultan Mehmet IV by the common efforts of the *'ulema* and rebellious soldiers. After his deposition, Mehmed IV was put under surveillance in the Palace and his brother Süleyman III ascended to the throne in November 1687. Meanwhile, Leopold had the opportunity to exert his reign on Hungary. The diet gathered in Pressburg on October 31, 1687, and concluded with the election of Leopold's son Joseph (1678-1711) as the King of Hungary. Moreover, by that time, Leopold had already fulfilled a treaty with the

IV was far from superseding some of his ancestors in competition with the European monarchs. Both Louis and Leopold, keen rivals of each other and individually powerful monarchs, contributed considerably to the strategic flourishing of their sovereignty in Europe. When the trajectory of the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire is observed, Mehmet IV had ruled long enough at relatively prosperous periods of the Empire, owing much to the fruitful regime of the Köprülü family members as Grand Viziers. In the 1660s and 1670s he had enjoyed the climax of the territorial expansion of the Ottoman authority in Central Europe. However, hunting parties had been his first occupation at a time when he could have worked to strengthen the Ottoman control in the region. He was such an obsessive hunting fan that he could not put off his hunting parties even when the Empire was going through the hardest days in its history. His reckless administration played a part in his dethronement.

⁴⁸ Silahdar, *Silahdar*, Vol 2, 261.

⁴⁹ Silahdar, *Silahdar*, Vol 2, 262-263.

⁵⁰ Silahdar, *Silahdar*, Vol 2, 270.

⁵¹ The war at Mohac, where previously in 1526 Süleyman II paved the way to Ottoman domination in Hungary, was the last reentrance attempt of the Ottoman Empire into Central Europe. In other words, their presence in Central Europe ended where it had started. During the months in 1687 reports kept coming from Egri and many other citadels, informing the urgent need for backing, but only in vain. The routes were blocked by the Habsburg troops and the Ottoman soldiers were discouraged by perpetual mobilization without a gain. Furthermore, the presence of intractable ex-brigand soldiers impaired the traditional troops' devotion to their generals and engendered a rebellious manner in the whole body of the army, thus bringing the Ottomans to the threshold of total collapse in Europe. *Silahdar*, Vol 2, 271-75.

ruler of Transylvania. On October 27, 1687, with the treaty of Blasendorf, Transylvania was finally convinced that the Habsburg presence in the region was permanent and agreed to pay 700.000 thalers to the Habsburgs.⁵²

As a result of this treaty, during the four years following the siege of Vienna in 1683, Ottoman presence in Central Europe came to an end after almost two centuries. Protection of Hungary, the most important element of the Ottoman administrative system in Europe,⁵³ necessitated a sapient and constantly vigilant military and political structure for long decades because the political proclivities of the locals were continuously oscillating between the Ottoman and Habsburg capitals. In only four years after 1683, Habsburg armies not only advanced into Hungary but also captured Belgrade and progressed further into the Balkan core lands of the Ottoman Empire with little difficulty. The Empire consumed all its resources. The discouraged soldiers were not obeying the orders to confront the continuously progressing enemies and, to exacerbate the situation, there were no sapient statesmen to take control. Considering the aforementioned psychological feeling of superiority over the Europeans, a peace call by the Ottomans was the least likely thing to happen. However, on July 11, 1688, Zülfikar and Alexander Mavrocordato, the Palace dragoman, were ordered to set off for Vienna.

⁵² Interestingly, during the four years following the defeat at Vienna, Apafy I Michael, the Prince of Transylvania from 1661 to 1690, continued sending his tribute to the Ottoman capital. Apafy, indeed, had cogent reasons to wish Ottoman protection over his principality. A peculiarity of the Ottoman sovereignty over Central European principalities was granting autonomous administration to the magnates, whereas Habsburg rule in its possessions was characterized by direct intervention, which, in Transylvania and Hungary, always created a religious squabble. However, in 1687, Apafy had nothing to do but give way to the continuously progressing Habsburg armies.

⁵³ Hungary, first of all, was functioning as a buffer region hindering direct Habsburg intervention to East Central European principalities. It was also economically important as the last stop of the spice route that started from Bursa in the sixteenth century and was still a slave trade point in the seventeenth century. For a survey of the place of Hungary in sixteenth century Ottoman Empire, see Halil İnalcık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 4th edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 299-311. One may argue, however, that the significance of Hungary on the part of Ottomans was based on being an Islamic frontier post in the heart of Central Europe, on lands where the Holy Roman Emperors claimed hereditary rights for centuries.

Ascension of a new Sultan to the Ottoman throne was apparently interpreted by the Ottoman statesman as a legitimate excuse to send a peace envoy to the Habsburg court. Theoretically, this could not occur without the Sultan's approval, but since Süleyman III spent all his life imprisoned in the Palace, it may be a spurious argument to assume that he took the initiative as soon as he became the ruler. It was most probably not the Sultan himself but the Ottoman statesmen in the Palace who considered the replacement of the Sultan as an opportunity to attempt to negotiate a peace treaty.⁵⁴ Zülfikar Efendi set off for Vienna in July, 1688 without knowing that he would soon be a quasi-captive representative of the Sultan in Vienna, although Habsburg statesmen advised Leopold on October 30, 1688, before Zülfikâr and Mavrocordato's presence at Vienna, "to agree to a negotiation" with them.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Colin Heywood mentions 'a peace party within the civil bureaucracy,' who supported the mission but doesn't give any name. Colin Heywood, "English Diplomatic Relations with Turkey, 1689-1698," in *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations*, in William Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış (eds.), (North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1984), 26-39. It seems more reasonable to argue that, in regard to the circumstances at the fronts during the last years, which constantly developed to the disadvantage of the Ottomans, most probably the general tendency in the Palace was already towards peace, regardless of whether there were conflicting parties on the issue.

⁵⁵ John Stoye, *Marsigli's Europe*, 71.

CHAPTER III

AN OTTOMAN ENVOY IN HOFBURG

3.1 Ottomans and the Europeans Involved In the Peace Talks

3.1.1 A Retrospective of the Diplomatic Relations in the Last Quarter of the Seventeenth Century

In his explanatory book about the rise of the European powers from the end of the seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, Jeremy Black has suggested that “Europe did change considerably in the period, not in technological, economic, social or governmental terms, but at least in territorial and political matters.”¹

Over the course of the seventeenth century the political activities and militarily dynamic condition of the European powers began to play more of a role in the European affairs than ever before. The second siege of Vienna was realized in the early phases of this time. Warfare in Eastern Europe that followed the siege of Vienna was not only preceded but also accompanied by a series of other consequential wars in the western sphere of the continent. An important aspect of

¹ Jeremy Black, *The Rise of the European Powers: 1679-1793* (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), xiii.

these interactions at the end of the seventeenth century was that the fighting did not take place only between the so-called Great Powers of the time, i.e., France, Austria, England and Ottoman Empire, but also included other secondary-rank rulers on the continent.² Every single political entity of the time, irrespective of its strength, sought an alliance group to benefit from in the short or long run. Since not only the Habsburgs, Venetians and Poles, but also the French, English and Dutch, participated in the talks in Vienna, the diplomatic network of the time necessitates a detailed delineation.

A snapshot of each nation gives the following picture: the Habsburgs, Venetians and Poles, members of the Holy League, were fighting against the Ottomans. The Habsburgs were also a part of an old rivalry with France, which continuously engendered war in Western Europe during the second half of the seventeenth century. Since the Habsburgs were the common enemy of the Muslim Ottoman Empire and Christian France, the Ottoman Empire and France had a love-hate relationship. The English and Dutch also joined France in the war against the Habsburgs because French King Louis XIV's ambitions in Western Europe permanently jeopardized their interests and well-being in the region. And since the English and Dutch always needed Leopold to stand against the French, the Emperor's occupation in Eastern Europe was undesirable for them. While Zülfikar

² According to Black, most of the remarkable and transformatory events of the seventeenth century came into being in the 1680s, not during Thirty Years' War: "It is equally appropriate to suggest that in so far as a major division can be seen in seventeenth-century European political history it should be located in the 1680s; that the previous decades can be regarded as in many respect a different period, one that marked the continuation of the group of major conflicts that began in the late 1610s and continued in the Thirty Years' War." Black argues that there were three main turning points in Europe in the 1680s: 1- The defeat of the Turks, which led to Austria's rise as a great power, 2- Russia's emergence as a great power, 3- Britain's 'Glorious Revolution' and the outbreak of an Anglo-French conflict as a consequent of it. He adds a number of secondarily important events to these three. Jeremy Black, *The Rise of the European Powers*, 3-6. For an analysis of the political achievements in Europe at the end of the seventeenth century, see David Kaiser, *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler* (Cambridge-Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), 196-202.

was in Vienna, Anglo-Dutch missions in the Ottoman and Habsburg capitals struggled to bring the war in Eastern Europe to an end.

It is useless to emphasize that the Ottoman peace attempt originated from the desperate condition of the Empire. By the time peace talks began in Vienna, the snapshot of the Ottoman fronts against the Holy League did not look promising. The united German army had advanced into the Balkans and was trying to make its way into Serbia and Bulgaria, where support of the local Christian population considerably helped the Imperials. Encouraged by the presence of Habsburg armies in the lower basins of the Danube along the Serbian and Bulgarian territories, the Christian population revolted, adding to the pressure of prolonged warfare. In summer of 1689, Istanbul was already informed of the Habsburg generals' letters and patents calling on the local Christian populace to revolt against the Sultan.³ Both voluntary military detachments (which were occasionally supported by the hajduts, and which later became part of the Habsburg army in the Balkans)⁴ as well as regular Habsburg army troops acted upon the patents that had been issued.⁵ To deal with the Christian population's revolt along the Danube, the Palace charged the provincial governments and Imre Thököly. An edict addressed to the *beylerbeyis* in Rumelia and to Imre Thököly in October 1689 ordered them to cooperate in order to deal with the problem along the Danube.⁶ Leopold, who always considered Louis a greater menace than the Sultan, constantly suffered from disadvantageous treaties with the Ottoman Empire and the anti-Habsburg revolts in Hungary. As was

³ Silahdar, *Silahdar*, Vol 2, 490-91.

⁴ Ivan Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, 76.

⁵ Ivan Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, 87. However, Charles Ingrao notes that "The Balkan peoples welcomed the imperial army at first, especially after Leopold had promised them religious freedom, tax exemptions, and national autonomy. Yet the proselytizing of the Jesuit missionaries who accompanied it soon cooled their enthusiasm and eliminated any chance of a general uprising against Ottoman rule." Charles Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 81.

⁶ Ahmet Refik, *Türk Hizmetinde Kral Tököli İmre: Macar Kralı Tököli İmre'ye Dair Hazine-i Evrak Vesikaları* (İstanbul: Mualim Ahmet Halim Kütüphanesi, 1922), 11-12.

stressed above, Leopold strived to thwart Kara Mustafa Pasha's campaign, but his envoy was ignored by the Grand Vizier. Now, the developments were beyond his expectations.

Since the 1644 Ottoman declaration of war against Crete (which they captured eventually), Ottoman-Venetian relations were not optimal. After the siege of Candia, which ended in 1669, the Venetian envoys dispatched to Ottoman capital had one purpose: to hinder further attacks on Venetian possessions.⁷ When the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha revealed his plan to march into Hungary, Venetians seemed to have gained what they wanted. But when the Ottoman armies failed in Vienna, the Venetians were ready to welcome the Pope's call to join the Holy League. They attacked the Ottoman possessions from three fronts: Mora (Morea), Bosnia and the Aegean islands. Under the command of Francesco Morosini, who had defended Crete against the Ottomans two decades before, the Venetian army, reinforced by Genoese, Spanish, Florence and Maltese fleets, completed the capture of Mora in 1686, and the fall of Athens soon followed in 1687. Just as it had helped the Habsburgs, the local Christian population helped the Venetians, facilitating their penetration both in Mora and in Bosnia.⁸ Letters from Ragusa to Venice, dated late 1686, reported the news of fleeing Turkish populations in Bosnia.⁹ Ottoman attempts to stop the Venetians were futile.¹⁰

Ottoman-Polish relations followed a relatively peaceful course until the 1660s; however, they began to retrograde gradually after the 1667 Polish-Russian

⁷ For a survey of the relationship between the Ottomans and the Venetians from 1670 on, see Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century* (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1991), 244-388.

⁸ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol. 3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, ?), 480.

⁹ Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks*, 279.

¹⁰ A collection of primary documents from Bosnian court registers of 1691-1694 provides evidence of problems encountered by the Ottomans on the Venetian front in Hersek (Herzegovina). Halil İnalçık, "Saraybosna Şeriye Sicillerine Göre Viyana Bozgunundan Sonraki Harb Yıllarında Bosna," *Tarih Vesikaları*, Vol. 2, No. 9 (1942), 1-10.

agreement.¹¹ This agreement disregarded Ukrainian Cossack existence in the region while dividing their land and led to the conquest of Kamanice (Kamianetz) by the Ottomans in 1672, as a result of the Cossacks' call for help from the Sultan. The treaty of Bucas (Buczacz) the same year required Poles to pay a tribute to the Ottomans. When the Polish envoy Jan Gninski visited Istanbul in 1677 following the Ottoman conquests in southern Poland, the Poles were aiming at acquiring at least a truce with the Ottomans because they were fighting on another front in the north. Already allied with France, the Poles wanted to secure their borders with the Ottomans. However, Gninski, in his meeting with the Grand Vizier, was the second envoy to be humiliated at the Ottoman Palace. Regarding Gninski as the representative of an inferior state, Kara Mustafa firmly asserted that whether the Poles were angry at the Sublime Porte or full of respect, the Ottoman Empire needed neither their friendship nor enmity.¹² Irrespective of his need for peace on the northern Polish border while planning a campaign against the Habsburgs, Kara Mustafa ruled out the possibility of Polish neutrality with his manner. This gave course to the Poles' rise as an enemy to the Ottomans in the north. Later, by bringing the siege of Vienna to an end, the Poles would be the protector and savior of Europe against the Ottoman armies. After the treaty of Holy League, the only front where Ottomans could be considered successful was the Polish front, where their success consisted of repelling Polish attacks on Kamanice, owing much to the support of the Crimean Khan.

¹¹ The same year, in order to appease the reservations of the Ottomans, the Poles sent an envoy to the Ottoman capital, but Kara Mustafa Pasha, who was *kaymakam* at that time, humiliated the Polish envoy, only later granting the '*ahdname*'. Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations* (Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 2000), 143

¹² Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, "Leh Belgelerde Devlet Adamı Kara Mustafa Pasha" in *Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa Uluslararası Sempozyumu 08-11 Haziran 2000* (Ankara: Merzifon Vakfı Yayınları, 2000), 120.

3.1.2 Louis XIV's Determinant Role

The consequence of French foreign policy in the second half of the seventeenth century is debatable.¹³ In regard to the interest of the current study (namely, the Ottoman peace attempt in Vienna and its background), the repercussions of Louis's foreign policy were profoundly consequential.¹⁴ Indeed, owing much to Louis's aspirations for the throne of Leopold, the western sphere of Europe was never more peaceful than the east. In 1686, Leopold had to establish the Grand Alliance (the League of Augsburg), which was another very considerable formation at that time in regard to its repercussions over the course of the ongoing Ottoman-Habsburg war. A number of political entities joined Leopold in the Grand Alliance against the French, and in fact, it was only France which remained outside this union of

¹³ The French foreign policy of the time, which interfered in every branch of the diplomatic network in the second half of the seventeenth century (especially after Louis XIV consolidated power in his hand personally), is today interpreted as free from premeditation. Contrary to what was previously believed to have been a feature of a so-called long-run ambition, now it is thought that the principal motivation of Louis XIV's aggressive policies was pragmatism: that is, his motivations were changing quickly in accordance with French interests: "Interpretations that assume an obvious course of action fly in the face of the international situation of the age and the problems and the opportunities confronting Louis." Jeremy Black, *The Rise of the European Powers*, 31. A resemblance between the Ottoman Imperial mind and Louis's personal perception of honour is noteworthy. Louis was "sensitive to the last degree in anything which affects his honour. In his eyes the defence of the honour or reputation (*gloire*) of France was inseparable from his own. It must be protected above all else, especially as he was convinced that France was the leading state in Europe and that he was the leading sovereign and his house the leading dynasty." Derek McKay, H.M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815* (London-New York: Longman, 1994), 16. For a comparison, see Chapter II, footnote 9. For an explanation of the view that the warfare at the end of the seventeenth century mainly aimed at glory, see David Kaiser, *Politics and War*, 196-198.

¹⁴ The abiding ambition of Louis the XIV during his almost three quarters long rule was establishing French hegemony in Europe in expense of Habsburg hegemony. In order to realize his goal he didn't hesitate to both support and fight against the Ottoman Empire. When the Habsburg general Montecuccoli inflicted a defeat on the army of the Grand Vizier Fazil Ahmet Pasha at St. Gotthard in 1663, French reinforcements noticeably contributed to the result. Likewise in 1669, Louis dispatched a well-prepared navy force to help Venetians in Candia, where the Ottomans laid more than a quarter century long siege. Faruk Bilici, "XVII Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Türk-Fransız İlişkileri: Gizli Harpten Objektif İttifaka," *Osmanlı*, Vol. 1 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999), 480-492. A lesser known remarkable detail about this relief force is that it was originally going to be a Scottish regiment commanded by Georg Douglas, Earl of Dumbarton, who was then fighting for the army of the French King in exchange of political support by French to the English King Charles II. By employing Scottish soldiers to fight in Crete, Louis apparently planned discrediting the English in the eyes of the Ottomans. Louis's decision to dispatch this regiment to Candia created a political tension between the French and the English. Some Scottish officers, however, somehow joined the French relief force in Candia. Matthew Glozier, *Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King: Nursery for Men of Honour* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004), 119-126.

Western European monarchs: Austria, Bavaria, Brandenburg, England, the Palatinate of the Rhine, Portugal, Saxony, Spain, Sweden and the United Provinces¹⁵ all joined Leopold to stop Louis XIV, who at the negotiations of Regensburg (Ratisbon) in August 1684 had benefited from Leopold's occupation with the Ottoman war. At Regensburg, Louis had managed to keep his acquisitions, namely, Strasbourg and Luxembourg, in exchange for a truce with the Emperor. For a couple of years Louis did not continue his habitual aggressiveness against the Emperor: Regensburg had brought him to the high point of his territorial expansion. Thanks to Louis's inactivity during that time, Leopold seized the opportunity of gaining Hungary and brought one and a half centuries of Ottoman expansion into Central Europe to an end. But it should be emphasized in advance that when Austrian armies progressed from all quarters towards Ottoman possessions in the Balkans, it changed Leopold's image in Europe and eventually paved the way for the French King's next declaration of war against Leopold in September 1689.¹⁶ The Emperor responded the next month on October 18 in like manner, and the war

¹⁵ The union was originally named 'The League of Augsburg.' It took the 'Grand Alliance' title after England joined in 1689.

¹⁶ The unification of the Balkan lands under the Habsburg dynasty would only weaken Louis, while strengthening Leopold's magnetism in Europe, an incontestable ground behind Louis's declaration of war in September 1688. For an evaluation of the effects of Leopold's achievements on the images of these two rivals in Europe, see Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers...*, 41. Indeed, from the 1680s on Louis's image in Europe was continuously in decline, despite his earlier illusionary attempts to gain support in Europe (footnote 21). The scholarship produced on the grounds of the second siege of Vienna considered even French diplomacy at Istanbul as the main reason behind the 1683 campaign. Ivan Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans...*, 29. Louis's manifestation of war detracted badly from the image he was striving to construct in the Christian world as the alternative of Leopold. For a picture of a satirical medal dated 1691 that represented Louis together with the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman III, Mezomorto Hüseyin Pasha [*Kapdân-i Derya*, the Ottoman admiral in chief], and James II, with the words 'Against The Spirit Of Christ' underneath them, see Peter Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1992), 138. The primary documents dated 1688-1694 harshly criticize Louis for his strategic alliance with the Ottomans. Two examples are *The Intrigues of the French King*, 1689. Image 8; and *A True and authentick copy of the most horrid and stupendious oath, whereby the French king confirmed his alliance with the Turks*, 1694. Both searchable at Early English books Online: <http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home> Ironically, other sources dated 1685, 1686 and 1687 reveal that Louis and his statesman, prior to deciding to help the Sultan in 1688, were busy with a grand plan to occupy the Ottoman capital. A recent study about the subject is Faruk Bilici, *XIV. Louis ve İstanbullu Fetih Tasarısı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2004)

in Western Europe that followed first and foremost helped the Ottomans by providing room for recovery in 1690 and 1691.

It was highlighted above how Louis's manifesto quickly followed the fall of Belgrade, since its capture meant an incredible expansion in Leopold's sphere of influence. Zülfikar's notes tell us that, nonetheless, a lesser known factor that influenced Louis's decision was a letter sent by the French ambassador at Istanbul. Upon the departure of the Ottoman delegation from the capital, the ambassador posted a message to his king and explained how a probable peace treaty would damage the relations between the French and Ottomans. According to Zülfikâr's narration, the chief reservation of the ambassador was not the peace treaty itself but rather a possible alliance between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs against the French. The letter arrived in France by mid-September and was followed by Louis's manifesto on war against Leopold in only ten days. Zülfikâr bemoans that Belgrade could not stand for another couple of weeks.¹⁷ He argues that if Belgrade, a heavily fortified key city, could stand for another couple of weeks, the Habsburgs would have severe problems in forming a defensive line beyond the Danube. Unfortunately for the Ottomans, Belgrade was captured only ten days before the Habsburgs started drawing back upon the call of Leopold to unite with the Dutch and English against the French. One may not know for sure whether holding Belgrade in 1689 would have contributed in successive years to directing the course of war in favor of the Ottomans, but in the following campaign seasons the conquest of Belgrade was going to be the primary objective of the Sultan.

¹⁷ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 117-119.

3.2 Zülfikar's Departure, Arrival at Vienna and First Contacts

On July 12, 1688, Zülfikâr Efendi and the Palace dragoman Alexander Mavrocordato were appointed as Ottoman envoys to the Habsburg court. They arrived at Niš in twenty-five days. They departed from Niš but had to return with Yeğen Osman Pasha, who was fleeing from the Habsburg armies, leaving the Danubian frontier wide open against the Habsburg forces. Zülfikar sent a letter to the Habsburg commander Piccolomini¹⁸ and requested a protection paper, safeguards and a translator in order to continue his journey. Yeğen Osman Pasha and Zülfikar dispatched two separate letters also to Istanbul, the former informing the Sultan about the state of the frontier and the latter informing him about the condition of the journey.¹⁹

Yeğen Osman Pasha was a former brigand. Since the Ottoman armies were engaged in battles at three fronts, the Palace could not find any means of handling him except recruiting him as the general of the Austrian front. He and his bandits joined the Sultan's army in March 1687 to hold the line at Esek, where the Danube intersects the Drava. By sending Yeğen Osman Pasha and his troops to the battlefield, the Palace aimed to eliminate them, as the Palace had decided that the expenditures for Pasha and his troops, which came (quite untraditionally) from the orphan's coffer, were being fruitlessly used. But Yeğen Osman Pasha figured out the plot against him, and he escaped from engagement with the enemy.

On August 22, Zülfikar sent another letter to Maximilian Emmanuel, Bavarian Elector of the Holy Roman Empire and the commander of the Imperial army that besieged Belgrade the same month, and requested him to send safeguards who would escort the Ottoman delegation along the Habsburg possessions until they

¹⁸ The name recorded by Zülfikar is Barfenine, whom he mentions as the Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikâr*, 2. The Habsburg commander of the southern Ottoman front at the time was Aenao Piccolomini.

¹⁹ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikâr*, 3-4.

arrived at Vienna. On August 29, Austrian soldiers, who were to escort the Ottoman representatives, arrived at Niš. Upon arriving, Zülfikar and the delegation set off a second time towards Vienna, and having passed the Hasan Pasha fort, they reached Smederevo (*Semendire*) on September 4.²⁰ Four days later, on September 8, they were at Belgrade, where the Austrians, on the pretext of replenishing their provisions, compelled Zülfikar and Mavrocordato to see the celebrations for the capture of the city on September 6/7.²¹ Zülfikar first refused entering Belgrade, asserting that they wanted to continue on their way and spend the night at Zemun, a small town on the other side of the Danube across Belgrade. Antonio Carafa, the commissary general of Leopold who was at Belgrade at that time, sent one of his lieutenants with two-hundred soldiers and invited Zülfikar and his men to the feast organized in their honor. Only then Zülfikar did accept joining the feast himself, and he stipulated that his men should cross the Danube while he was in the city; the Habsburgs agreed to his offer. Having left Belgrade, it took thirty-five days for Zülfikar and his men to get to the mansion of Potendorf, where they arrived on October 14. During their presence in the Habsburg lands, this mansion outside of Vienna was home to the Ottomans.

During the journey from Belgrade to Potendorf, Carafa continuously asked Zülfikar the reasons behind their visit. Zülfikar, who denied giving information until he and his men arrived at Potendorf, handed over the letter written by the Grand Vizier to the deputy of the Emperor only after he had arrived safely. Having learned that Zülfikar and Mavrocordato were authorized to carry out peace negotiations in the name of the Ottoman Sultan, Leopold informed²² his Polish and Venetian allies (in accordance with the alliance treaty that had formed the Holy League between

²⁰ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikâr*, 5.

²¹ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikâr*, 7.

²² Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikâr*, 16.

them in 1684)²³ that they could prepare their clauses. On December 31, 1688, the Ottoman delegates were apprised by Carafa of the decision taken at the Habsburg court; they were told that the meeting would be held with the Emperor and that thereafter the peace talks would start.²⁴ The next day Zülfikar notified Carafa of his contentment and requested the announcement of the certain date of the meeting as soon as possible.

Before the meeting with Leopold was held, the representative rank and status of Zülfikar Efendi came on the scene as a disputation between the Ottomans and the Holy League members. Arguing that the rank of an Ottoman envoy would greatly matter at the Habsburg court may not be an overstatement. It has already been explained above how, since the commencement of the political, diplomatic and military competition between the two Empires roughly from the concurrent rise of Süleyman the Lawgiver to the Ottoman throne and Charles V to the Ottoman throne, a symbolic war accompanied the war on the battlefield.²⁵ However, one may argue that, at the given time (1689), the Habsburgs' attention on the status of Zülfikar as an Ottoman envoy did not arise out of the Habsburgs' caution not to humiliate a strong, old and redoubtable enemy. On the contrary, it most likely stemmed from the remarkable achievements that clearly altered the balance between the two Empires to the advantage of the Habsburgs, who apparently did not want to overesteem a weakened challenger.²⁶ Kara Mehmet Pasha, who had visited Vienna after the Treaty of Vasvar, was welcomed and shown excessive respect and

²³ The Holy League alliance treaty had thwarted all independent steps for the members of the unity, including negotiations with their common enemies without the consent or the participation of the others.

²⁴ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 19.

²⁵ See Chapter II, footnote 22.

²⁶ Early and late historians agree on the significance of the Habsburg achievements against the Turks on the eve of the eighteenth century. "The two military campaigns in 1688 and 1689 are by far the most brilliant for the Imperial armys during all those Turkish wars." Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, quoted in Ivan Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, 75. "Leopold's forces achieved a series of conquests unparalleled in the annals of the Turkish wars." Charles Ingrao, *The Habsburg*, 79.

hospitality by the Emperor. As he was instructed, Mehmed Pasha had kissed the Emperor on his chest and the Emperor had kissed him on his shoulders.²⁷ Kara Mehmed Pasha himself and Evliya Çelebi, who was within Kara Mehmed Pasha's entourage, both recorded that the Habsburgs had amply paid for all of their expenditures.²⁸ Now, the turning tide of fortunes had predictably decreased the prestige of the Ottoman envoys in the eyes of the Habsburgs.

On January 20, 1689, Carafa sent his response to the letter of Zülfikar and reported the message of the Polish and Venetian representatives, who wanted to know whether Zülfikar had letter of credentials (*itimadnâme*) authorizing him to deliver the Sultans' terms and letters to Warsaw and Venice.²⁹ The next day, Zülfikar dispatched a short letter to Carafa and expressed that he had letter of credentials as well as clauses to be declared to the Poles and Venetians.

The letter delivered to Zülfikar and Mavrocordato on January 22, 1689, finally approved the meeting with the Emperor at the Habsburg court. In the letter delivered by Leopold's *dolmetscher* Lachowiz, Carafa told Zülfikar that the letter written by the Grand Vizier was authorizing him as a plenipotentiary (*me'zun ve murahhas*) representative but not a grand ambassador, which was a different – higher – rank. Thus, Zülfikar would be considered as a secondary rank delegate at the court.³⁰ Zülfikar's request to send a messenger to Istanbul after the meeting was denied on the dubious pretext that allowing him to do so would necessitate the same

²⁷ Songül Çolak, *Viyana'da Osmanlı Diplomasisi (Zülfikar Pasha'nin Mükaleme Takriri)* (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2007), 25.

²⁸ Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri...*, 36.

²⁹ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 22-23.

³⁰ Earlier, another letter by the Habsburg dragoman had explained in a detailed manner the instructions to be followed before, during and after the meeting with the Emperor. Every envoy, including Leopold's allies' envoys, was supposed to take off his head dress and bow. Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 26-28.

for Polish and Venetian envoys.³¹ As one will observe throughout the narration of Zülfikar, the dispatching of a courier to provide communication with the Ottoman Palace was going to be a major point of disputation between Zülfikar and the Habsburg delegates. Obviously, having advanced deep into the former Ottoman possessions with little difficulty and not seeing any signs of recovery on the Ottoman part, Leopold first wanted to listen to the proposal of Zülfikar and then fully benefit from the situation by keeping his most recent conquests in his hand—to which the Ottoman delegates would remain oblivious if they agreed to sign a treaty under *uti possidetis*.

3.2.1 At the Habsburg Court

On February 10, 1689, Zülfikar and Mavrocordato finally appeared before the Habsburg court. Leopold had sent his own carriage for them, and Zülfikar notes that the people who wanted to see them had rushed into the court. Mustafa Aga carried the letter over his head, his body slightly bent, and Zülfikar, after kissing the letter, left it next to the Emperor.³² Zülfikar started to talk after receiving permission, and he quickly declared the new Sultan's goodwill to maintaining the friendship of their predecessors.³³

Leopold said that the Habsburgs did not wish this war to happen and that they had always struggled to remain loyal to the treaty (Vasvar) with the Ottomans. He added that their fulfillments since the beginning of the war in 1683 were God's present to them for their allegiance to the peace. In response to the Sultan's declaration of good intentions, he said that they too wished for the well-being of the

³¹ During the talks, the Poles and Venetians easily communicated with their rulers when needed; Zülfikar, on the other hand, had to wait for more than six months till the Ottoman courier was given permission to report the circumstances to the Sultan.

³² Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikâr*, 33.

³³ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikâr*, 33.

people, and he concluded his speech by saying that he had appointed delegates for peace negotiations to start.³⁴

Indeed, having heard about the decision of a Hungarian campaign from Istanbul, Leopold sent an envoy to the Ottoman capital. When the German envoy Albert von Caprara visited the Sublime Porte in 1682 to maintain peace, the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha stipulated unacceptable conditions in order to block renewal of peace, demanding that new castles on the border be destroyed and that tribute be paid to the Uyvar region as compensation for runaway war prisoners. Unsurprisingly, the German envoy did not welcome these demands, and Leopold started negotiations in Europe to form an alliance against the Ottomans that ended with the formation of the Holy League in 1684.³⁵

The peace talks between the Ottomans and the allies were to be performed in more than ten gatherings, but the main rounds of talks were held in seven meetings during the winter and spring of 1689. The first meeting was held in order for each involved party to express its general opinions and intentions. As one may observe in the records of Zülfikar, during the talks Zülfikar adopted a resolute manner to protect the dignity of the Sultan, who was ruling an Empire that for centuries had followed through with its initiatives in Central Europe without menace of an equally powerful political entity in the region.

3.3 Peace Talks With Representatives

The negotiations on February 10, 1689, started with disagreements about whether the delegates possessed genuine letters of credentials. Zülfikar notes that he did not declare his clauses to the Polish and Venetian delegates because he doubted

³⁴ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikar*, 34.

³⁵ Nicolae Iorga, *Osmanlı Tarihi* Vol. 4, 165-166.

whether they were plenipotentiary representatives authorized to perform talks in the name of their masters. Even though a Venetian envoy introduced his paper substantiating his permission and authority, it was understood that the Polish king had not sent a fully authorized envoy. In order not to lose time, Zülfikar proposed that the Austrians and Venetians start negotiations before the arrival of the authorized envoy from Warsaw. Nevertheless, the allies were firmly and unanimously committed to participating in the talks all together, and Zülfikar could not change their minds. Without further developments, the second stage came to an end.³⁶

3.3.1 The Terms of the Ottomans

In the next meeting on February 15, Zülfikar finally had the chance to open talks. The Ottomans had two separate proposals putting forth different conditions. The first proposal stipulated a permanent peace, according to which both Austrians and Venetians had to return some parts of the territories they captured; the second proposal was an interim truce stipulating that each party would keep its acquisitions till the end of the truce. Transylvania, a vassal of the Sultan, was to be restored to its former situation and pay its tribute to the Ottomans under the common protection of the Ottoman Sultan and the Habsburg Emperor. In addition, in case they preferred signing an interim peace, the allies had to allow the Ottomans to communicate and deliver support to the still uncaptured forts, which remained within the new Habsburg possessions.³⁷ Although the Imperials advanced to the Bulgarian border in the Balkans, several Ottoman strongholds continued to defend themselves within Habsburg borders. This last clause, in particular, pertained to the Habsburgs.

³⁶ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 39-40.

³⁷ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 40-41

Neither the Habsburgs nor the Venetians answered Zülfikar's terms or commented on the pretext of the Polish envoy's absence.

Zülfikar tried to persuade the Habsburg and Venetian delegates to talk in the name of the Poles too, (lest the negotiations be postponed again), but he couldn't convince them. However, he was able to declare the conditions for the Poles; according to his proposal, the Poles would keep their acquisitions in hand but they had to agree destruction of Kamanica Castle(*Kamianetz*).³⁸

3.3.2 The Anglo-Dutch Mediation

Previously, after arriving at Vienna, Zülfikar had sent a letter to the Dutch representative of the English King William III in Vienna,³⁹ asking to talk about his mediation during the upcoming peace talks. The Dutch representative, who at the time declined Zülfikar, later came and visited the Ottoman delegates in Potendorf once he had received a letter from the Hague reporting the Ottoman Sultan's sanction for the Dutch to work as peacemaker in Vienna. As is shown below, this mediation between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs was not simply a friendly effort to reconcile the two Empires, but a necessity for the good of Anglo-Dutch existence in Western Europe and their interests in the Levant.

The repercussions of the wars in Western Europe in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the economic competition in the Levant, and the connection between them exemplify the ever-intensifying international interactions of the time. It should first be emphasized that despite being Dutch and being called 'the Dutch' by Zülfikar, the 'Dutch' envoy was an agent of the English King William III (1689-1702). When Louis declared war on the Palatinate only two weeks after the fall of

³⁸ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 43.

³⁹ The refereed Dutch representative was most probably the State General's permanent Resident at the Habsburg Court, J. J. Hamel Bruyninx.

Belgrade in September 1688, the English King was James II, a Catholic ruler, who would remain neutral according to Louis's calculation. Only five months after the French King's declaration of war on Leopold (in February 1689), William ascended to the throne. William III, a Protestant ruler, was also the *Stadtholder* (the hereditary and crowned head of the state of the Dutch Republic) and, thus, was simultaneously benefiting from the English and the Dutch. Without losing any time, William III joined Leopold in the Grand Alliance against the French.⁴⁰ Since the Grand Alliance was not strong enough to meet incoming French armies without Leopold's forces, the Emperor should have been freed from his occupation against the Ottomans in Eastern Europe.

Meanwhile, the English, Dutch and French were fighting another war in the Levant, an economic competition to maximize their benefit from the Ottoman capitulations.⁴¹ When Louis attempted to employ a Scottish regiment in his relief force that helped the Venetians in Candia in 1669, it caused the English king Charles II to mobilize his diplomats to thwart employment of this regiment against the Ottomans. Both rulers had a common anxiety: the moment that the Ottomans realized who was helping to the Venetians, it would first and foremost damage their economic interests in the Levant.⁴² In fact, until the end of the third quarter of the seventeenth century it was the Dutch who took the biggest share from the Levant trade. But from the beginning of the last quarter of the seventeenth century on, the

⁴⁰ Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers*, 43-45.

⁴¹ For a background and analysis of the Dutch, English and French economic rivalry in the Levant at the end of the seventeenth century, see Mehmet Bulut, *Ottoman-Dutch Economic Relations: in the early modern period 1571-1699* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2000), 186-194.

⁴² A report posted to Venice in 1669, included the following statement in regard to the English King's reservations: "Because considerations of trade do not permit that a subject of that Crown [English] shall proceed to fight against the Ottoman Porte." In a letter he wrote to his sister, Charles II had mentioned "the reasons for not irritating the Turk which might provoke a vigorous reaction against the capital which this nation has at the markets of the Levant and against the persons of the English." Matthew Glozier, *Scottish Soldiers in France...*, 120-121. For an observation of the activities of the English community in İzmir (*Smyrna*), see Sonia P. Anderson, *An English Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667-1678* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), especially 117-174.

French and English began to increase their shares, thanks to the renewed capitulations of the former in 1673 and the latter in 1675.

In short, in addition to being a struggle to restore their economic leadership in the Levant, the Anglo-Dutch mediation in Vienna spearheaded by *Stadtholder* English King William III was an attempt to

...detach, by a mediated peace, the Austrian Habsburgs from their Holy League allies and their ongoing and intermittently successful counter-offensive against the Ottomans in time to throw the weight of their best troops and best generals into the struggle of the Grand Alliance against the hegemonic design of Louis XIV.⁴³

Naturally the enterprise was launched by the English and the Dutch, not the Ottomans. As early as 1687, seeing the benefits which might accrue to English trade and commerce, the English ambassador in the Ottoman capital had made a suggestion to his King for English mediation between the Sultan and the Emperor, but it was rejected in the Cabinet.⁴⁴ In the autumn of 1688, the Dutch envoy in Istanbul reported The Hague's friendship and allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan and requested the permission of Süleyman III for a Dutch delegate to work as a peacemaker between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, and the Sultan gave his permission. It should be emphasized in advance that, despite the permission given by the Sultan, King William's agents (who were replaced several times in Vienna during 1689-1693 period) could not alter the course of the negotiations, which soon turned out to be inconclusive after only three months.

William's agents' made a proposal to the Emperor to mediate between him and the Sultan on September 20, 1688.⁴⁵ The Habsburg envoys did not allow the Emperor to talk to Zülfikar for a couple of months, most likely because if the

⁴³ Colin Heywood, "Work in Progress,"

⁴⁴ Colin Heywood, "English Diplomatic Relations with Turkey, 1689-1698," in William Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış (eds.), *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations* (North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1984), 26-39.

⁴⁵ Colin Heywood, "English Diplomatic Relations with Turkey," 29.

envoys were allowed to talk to the Emperor then they might have heard about the advance of the French, which would have undercut the Austrians' strategy of keeping the Ottoman delegation out of contact with the Sultan. When they finally came together, William's representative delivered his permission, and Zülfikar asserted that they would accept the mediation as long as the Emperor welcomed it.⁴⁶

In their talks with Zülfikar, the mediators showed themselves to be supporters of the Austrian side. They reminded Zülfikar of the superiority of the Habsburg armies against the Ottomans on all fronts. According to them, the Habsburgs' occupation with the French in Western Europe was not a heavy burden on the military resources of Leopold since all German princes, along with Sweden, Denmark, Spain and England, had united against Louis XIV.

Before the Habsburg representatives officially declared their clauses, the Dutch gave an outline to Zülfikar. Leopold demanded all of the Balkan territories which were originally connected to the Hungarian crown before the Ottoman conquests in Central Europe, extending as far as Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgaria. Contrary to earlier expressed Ottoman clauses, Erdel (*Transylvania*) was excluded from the Habsburgs' conditions since, from Habsburg's point of view, the Imperial army had established its control in the region and the population had declared their content.⁴⁷ Zülfikar's confidence about the strength of his master was high; he said that the Sultan had innumerable sources from which he could conscript fresh forces, regardless of the condition.⁴⁸ However, one may argue that the mediators had

⁴⁶ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 43-45.

⁴⁷ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 46-48.

⁴⁸ It was true to an extent. Contemporary foreign observers from the 1660s and 1692 confirmed the view that the Ottoman Sultans had plentiful human resources. The first one was a recommendation from the Habsburg commander Montecuccoli to Leopold. "Even twenty victories over them would not be enough to crush their might. On the contrary, one defeat of the Emperor might cost him everything." Ivan Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, 117. The second was made by the English diplomat and tradesman Thomas Coke: "...Notwithstanding their great losses, they [the Turks] never fail of an army next yeare and their souldiers are constantly pay'd, not will the Empire ever want

justifiable arguments with regard to developments of the last few years on the battle fronts, which mainly served Leopold.⁴⁹ It was hard for the Dutch to offer what Zülfikar expected from them, a nation which had been in good relations with the Sultans.

William's representatives kept coming and going to the Habsburg capital but they never produced the outcomes desired by the English and the Dutch, whose priority was Louis XIV. Colin Heywood put forth several explanations for the failure of Anglo-Dutch diplomacy in Vienna:

...amongst the most significant may be mentioned the uncertain and lengthy lines of communication which hindered effective diplomacy; mutual Ottoman-Habsburg intransigence and bad faith in dealing with 'infidels'; the victory of the 'easterners' at the Vienna court in the policy struggles which went on continuously around the emperor; the ascendancy of France at the Porte and...the frequent failure by English and Dutch diplomats in the field to implement what was supposed to be common Anglo-Dutch policy.⁵⁰

In the fourth meeting the envoys exchanged their letters of credential. The Habsburg representatives gave to Zülfikar the authorization letter by Leopold, which he had originally issued to his representatives Kinsky and Starhemberg on February 27, 1689, and in which he had announced to all German princes that he gave permission to the aforementioned names to carry out peace negotiations. The fourth meeting, too, came to an end without any discussion on the peace conditions.

men or money sufficient, tho not in such a degree as when it was in its meridian, and they think the Germans will be tyr'd before them, and should they gett but one victory in the field, they should soon recover their losses..." Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks*, 391. It is noteworthy that this remark was made after the Ottomans' heavy 1691 defeat at Slankamen, where the Ottoman Grand Vizier Fazıl Mustafa Pasha lost his life on the battlefield.

⁴⁹ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 48-49.

⁵⁰ Colin Heywood, "An Undiplomatic Anglo-Dutch dispute at the Porte: The Quarrel Between Coenrad van Heemskerck and Lord Paget (1693)," in Alastair Hamilton, Alexander H. De Groot and Maurits H. Van Den Boogert (eds.), *Friends and Rivals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant from the Seventeenth Century to the Early Nineteenth Century* (Leiden-Boston-Köln: Brill, 2000), 59-94.

The Habsburgs, for a third time, did not allow the Ottoman representatives to send a messenger to Istanbul.⁵¹

3.4 Negotiations Come to a Deadlock

The fifth meeting on March 2 was supposed to be the first stage of discussions of the terms. Zülfikar's impatience gradually grew as the Habsburg delegation, instead of commencing negotiations, brought forward preconditions for peace. Whatever the Emperor's actual ambitions were, it was obvious that one of his purposes in bringing forward these conditions was to plan to secure a treaty that would compensate his financial and territorial losses as well as his dignity in Europe. The preconditions included payment of war expenditures and the handing over of Imre Thököly, whom the Habsburg representatives portrayed as the catalyst behind the ongoing warfare and whom the Habsburg argued should be returned by the Ottomans since he was a former vassal of the Habsburgs.⁵² Zülfikar firmly asserted the inappropriateness of these demands from the Ottoman point of view, refusing to discuss the payment of war expenditures and adding that the peace talks were not convened to talk about Thököly's fate.⁵³

With the combined support of the French King and the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha, Imre Thököly had gradually transformed himself into one of the main figures of the anti-Habsburg movement during the second half of the 1670s. The main reason behind the anti-Habsburg movement in Hungary was Leopold's ever-intensifying repressive and intolerant policy with regards to Hungarians. Thököly, the son of a Calvinist nobleman "whose estates had been seized following

⁵¹ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 49–51.

⁵² Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 51.

⁵³ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 52.

the magnate conspiracy,”⁵⁴ gradually became the leader of the movement and began storming the Habsburg frontier in Hungary.⁵⁵ Leopold’s attempts to isolate Thököly by sending four envoys to the Ottoman capital did not yield any results.⁵⁶

In 1689/90, handing over Thököly to the Habsburgs would have been a major strategic mistake since he was the only tool that the Ottomans had to set their claims to Transylvania. The Ottomans continued charging Thököly in the campaigns of the 1690s; as observed in the *muhimme registers* from 1690 on, Imre Thököly, appointed King of Hungary (*Orta Macar*), was indispensable for the legitimization of the Ottoman Empire’s claims in Transylvania. In the orders sent to the princes in Transylvania, the Sultan declared Thököly’s appointment as King and promised religious freedom to those who obeyed him.⁵⁷ Thus, Thököly by no means could have been a pre-condition for the Ottomans, and in fact, the Habsburgs’ demand for Thököly itself was enough to stop negotiations in Zülfikar’s mind. Two days later, King William’s Dutch representative visited Zülfikar and reiterated that as long as they didn’t agree on the pre-conditions laid out by the Habsburgs they wouldn’t be able to conclude a peace treaty. But the Ottoman envoys were willing to deny these preconditions even at the cost of a peace treaty.⁵⁸

From the paper he sent to King William’s representative after this meeting, it is understood that Zülfikar was almost convinced that the Emperor did not intend to sign a peace treaty. Zülfikar emphatically told the Dutch envoy to notify the

⁵⁴ Charles Ingraio, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 73. The magnate conspiracy was an attempt to throw off Habsburg and other foreign influences on Hungary. The attempted coup was caused mostly by the Peace of Vasvár, which proved to be an unpopular treaty among Hungarians. The poorly organized attempt at revolt gave the Habsburg throne reason to clamp down on religious and political freedom in Hungary. The magnate conspiracy is also called the Wesselényi conspiracy, after Count Ferenc Wesselényi, a Hungarian noble (or *magnate*). Charles Ingraio, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 67-69.

⁵⁵ Caroline Finkel, *Rüyadan İmparatorluğa Osmanlı: Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Öyküsü 1300-1923*, trans. Zülal Kılıç (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2007), 254.

⁵⁶ Charles Ingraio, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 73.

⁵⁷ Ahmet Refik, *Türk Hizmetinde Kral Tököli İmre*, 11, 12-23, 34-39 and others.

⁵⁸ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikar*, 53.

Habsburg delegates that the Sultan's conditions could not be changed or modified, and he added that carrying out the talks under the current conditions was useless. The Dutch mediator advised Zülfikar to demand another assembly, and while Zülfikar followed this suggestion, his hope for a treaty in Vienna was already lost before exchanging any peace terms,⁵⁹ although it had been only six weeks since he had met the Emperor.

⁵⁹ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikar*, 54-55.

CHAPTER IV

STRUGGLE IN VAIN

4.1 Terms of the Emperor

In two days the representatives came together for a sixth time. Finally, the Habsburgs handed over their peace terms on the condition that Thököly would be the primary issue to be settled in the aftermath of a possible peace treaty. The clauses were as follows.

- 1-The lands Ottomans wanted to be returned in the occasion of a peace treaty were already originally possessions of the Holy Roman Emperor and the Hungarian crown. They can not be returned. Besides, the Sultan shall abandon the Bosnian, Serbian and Bulgarian lands, which were a part of the Hungarian crown since the ancient times.
- 2- Both sides shall be allowed to construct castles in their possessions as long as the security of the region and population necessitated.
- 3- Both sovereigns shall provide security within their borders. The Sultan himself shall punish the frontier raiders and Tatars if they attack to the Habsburg possessions.
- 4- The enemies and disloyal subjects of the Sultan and the Emperor shall not be protected by the other side.
- 5- Tradesman from both sides, operating in lands and seas of each other shall be exempted from all kinds of taxation. The emperor shall be allowed to send representatives to appropriate locations in the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan shall grant them the same prerogatives granted to the other non-Muslim (*zimmi*) and protected (*müste'men*) subjects.
- 6- The captives on both sides shall be exchanged.
- 7- The protection of Jerusalem shall be returned to the Catholic priests from the Orthodoxies. Catholic pilgrims shall be allowed to travel in the region and performance of Catholic rituals in the district shall be free and undisturbed.

- 8- The envoys of both sides shall be welcomed and esteemed in conformity with their rank and status.
- 9- The Sultan shall also seek consent of Polish King and the Venetian Doge and conclude independent peace treaties with them.
- 10- Boğdan (*Moldavia*) shall be emptied.¹

Predictably, Zülfikar turned down all the terms. He again invited the Dutch representative, who could render little to help the Ottomans except listen to their complaints, and informed the Sultan that there would be no need to sign a peace treaty. He expressed the inconvenience of the Hapsburg's bringing forward of additional terms related to the Ottoman subjects as well as the taxation of the tradesmen and stated that he was in Vienna to negotiate on nothing but territorial matters. Having met with the Hapsburg envoys, the Dutch sent a letter to Zülfikar saying that the Hapsburg representatives, too, wanted both to listen to and have a written copy of Zülfikar's counter-arguments.²

By mid-March, representatives met a seventh time in order for Zülfikar to deliver his response to the peace terms announced by the Habsburgs. Zülfikar stated that a peace between two rulers could be affirmed in either two distinct manners: Either, the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans would sign a permanent treaty which would console each side by assuring a satisfactory share for each side, or conversely, they would endorse an interim peace at least for the sake of subjects' comfort and well-being, allowing each side to keep their most recent acquisitions in their hand until the end of the truce. He added that the Sultan would show consent for either situation.³ Zülfikar went on, however, the terms laying claim on almost the entire Balkans were by no means negotiable because the Sultan was already demanding restoration of pre-war conditions in various

¹ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikar*, 56-58. The postscripts rehearsed that as long as Thököly wont be imprisoned immediately, the peace can not be concluded.

² Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikar*, 56-58.

³ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikar*, 63.

regions. Therefore, they could only negotiate on an interim peace. He added that, no need to assert again, the Sultan was firm on his terms for a permanent peace.⁴ In the same meeting, having argued a few minor details, Zülfikar noted that peace treaties between belligerent nations would always take into consideration the contentment of each side. He declared again his determination to sign a peace treaty, but it only if the document satisfied each party's expectations. For the Sultan, it meant the return of Buda.

On March 24, 1689, Antoni Carafa visited Zülfikar and notified him of the Emperor's answer to the conditions stipulated by the Ottomans during the last meeting. At the last meeting Zülfikar had stressed that as long as the Emperor would not open the roads to the Ottoman castles that were still defending themselves within the Habsburg territories; the Sultan would not agree to any treaty. These castles included strongholds such as Kanije (*Nagykanizsa*), Szigetvar, Temeşvar (*Timisoara*) and Varad (*Oradea*) as well as a number of less significant fortifications in and around Hungary. Moreover, Zülfikar had requested that Erdel (*Transylvania*) be restored to its former situation. Carafa, who was as resolute as Zülfikar in satisfying this master, responded resolutely that the aforementioned castles were too far within the recently captured Habsburg possessions and that their fall was to be highly expected. He added that the fact that Erdel was completely under control of the Emperor and Eflak (*Walachia*) had already declared its subjection to the Hapsburgs, the Sultan's insistence on such conditions was entirely impracticable. Furthermore, Habsburg forces wintering along the Bulgarian border at Niš were only hours away from Bosnia. Carafa, mentioning the disarray in Anatolia and Rumelia and the bad

⁴ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikar*, 64.

state of the Sultan's army as opposed to the advantageous position of the Emperor against the French armies, pointed out the weak state of the Sultan against the Emperor. That is to say, the terms laid down by Zülfikar were impractical.⁵

In fact, the historical data confirms the Austrians' reiterations of tumult in Rumelia and Anatolia at that time. Cengiz Orhonlu, who examined the period's existing *muhimme registers*, revealed that the years extending from 1691 to 1696 marked an era of large-scale social mobilization in the Ottoman provinces.⁶ During 1687 and 1688 the Habsburg armies had marched into Ottoman Balkan territories almost without a fight. As mentioned above, the Christian population in this region willingly joined the Habsburg army, sometimes without waiting a call by the newcomers.⁷ After a while, although most of the population took refuge again in Ottoman lands after facing Jesuit proselytizing, a remarkable number of non-Muslim population started to immigrate to Austrian territories, reaching Austrian mainland at times.⁸ Correspondingly, throughout Anatolia and Syria, where the number of security troops was far smaller than the protection of the subjects necessitated, banditry was rampant and forced many peasants to abandon their villages.⁹ As Orhonlu concludes, in the following five years, 1691 to 1696, this depopulation forced the Ottoman's central government to implement a resettlement project for certain nomadic tribes in order to support these now deserted regions.

⁵ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 70-72.

⁶ Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin İskanı* (İstanbul: Eren, 1987), 29-54.

⁷ Chapter III, footnote 5 and 10.

⁸ Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda*, 33-34.

⁹ Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda*, 42-43.

4.2 Zülfikar's Demand to Leave

It is necessary to emphasize, however, that Zülfikar, be he informed or not about the circumstances, - irrespective of how unrealistic they were - could not change his demands without further instructions from his master as such a digression would be punishable by death. Nonetheless, one may agree that the Emperor was correspondingly too optimistic. His ever-growing Balkan aspirations hindered him from being "less maximalistic and more realistic,"¹⁰ Nevertheless, when considered within the circumstances of the war, the Habsburgs' refusal to return the castles and their disinterest in signing a peace treaty that would return some of the captured territories to the Ottomans was quite understandable. It is quite likely that when war began Leopold did not expect his armies to progress into Balkans with that such ease. Now his achievements had increased his resolve to keep all his acquisitions in his hand, although restoring his hereditary right within Hungary was his ultimate goal in the formation of the Holy League. Indeed, considering how he suffered a disadvantageous treaty in Vasvar after defeating the Ottoman army there and the fact that Kara Mustafa Pasha had rejected all his proposals to extend the peace before the siege of Vienna, one should not blame Leopold for being so devoted to suing for such a broadly advantageous peace. That is to say, within these conditions Zülfikar and the Habsburg representatives could not manage to sign a reasonable peace treaty, which would persuade both sides.

During the following days, the Dutch envoy visited Zülfikar and Mavrocordato three times and informed them that their departure papers would be prepared quickly and they would be allowed take their depart soon. First however, the Dutch envoy recommended that Zülfikar and Mavrocordato should inform the Habsburg

¹⁰ Ivan Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans...*, 122.

representatives if they had at all altered their original conditions for peace.¹¹ Not surprisingly, Zülfikar was resolute in his demands.

Meanwhile, Zülfikar began to think that conclusion of a peace treaty which would include terms favored by both sides was impossible. He sent one of his men to the Bohemian chancellor Count Ulrich Kinsky, one of the representatives of the Emperor at the Habsburg court at the time, and requested permission to return Ottoman lands. Count Kinsky countered by informing Zülfikar that the Polish envoy was on his way to Vienna. He offered to commence talks with the Venetian representatives until the Polish delegate arrived. Zülfikar accepted this request. Earlier, on February 15, the Ottomans had already expressed in general terms the conditions to be stipulated to the Venetians. Zülfikar sent another courier to the Venetian representatives and requested them to announce their terms.¹²

4.3 Terms of Venetians

In early April, the Venetian envoy sent their clauses to Zülfikar Pasha. Foremost, Venice desired for the island of Eğriboz (*Euboea*) to be evacuated. In the four years between 1688 and 1692, the Venetians had already managed to capture Mora and wished to secure the hold of several strategic points along the Aegean and Adriatic Sea in order to be able to defend Mora. Like the Habsburgs, they asked permission to build castles where security necessitated. The Ottomans should have abolished the tax they were taking from Venice for Zaklise (*Zakynthos*) island as well disclaim the yearly tribute paid by Venice to the Sultan.¹³ Zülfikar was indeed surprised at the Venetians' demands of territory and castles in light of the Sultan's earlier rejection of the Emperor's similar demands. It was not apparent to Zülfikar

¹¹ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 72-77.

¹² Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 77.

¹³ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 79-80.

of the unlikely success of a peace treaty. Nonetheless, with a last bit of hope, he requested to hear the clauses of the Polish envoy who had finally arrived at Vienna.¹⁴ Soon the Polish envoy handed over to Zülfikar Pasha his letter of credentials which was signed on March 6 in Warsaw.¹⁵

Before Zülfikar Pasha and the Polish representatives started to negotiate again, Zülfikar sent a letter to the Dutch envoy in order to reassert that the conditions expressed in the name of the Sultan could not be changed within the existing circumstances. He emphasized that the demands of the Venetians were neither agreeable nor negotiable.¹⁶ Zülfikar had no doubt that the Habsburgs and the Venetians were not eager to sign a treaty and instead wished to stall negotiations. In his response, the Dutch representative tried once again to encourage Zülfikar to continue negotiations and reply to the Venetians. Zülfikar, despite the whole mental reluctance agreed replying to the Venetians, though he did not express much more than his earlier remarks to the Dutch representative and again stressed the impracticality of the Venetian terms.¹⁷

4.4 Terms of the Poles

Zülfikar Pasha was by now convinced that staying any longer in Vienna was pointless. He continued sending letters to the Dutch envoy and requested from him to do all he could do to expedite the issuing of departure papers from the Habsburg court. As Zülfikar was attempting to depart from Vienna a minor Polish envoy arrived at the court although the main representative was still yet to come. Zülfikar Pasha sent a letter to the then present envoy in Vienna and said that the time given

¹⁴ Zülfikar will mention the terms of Poles later. Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 81. This Polish envoy was still not the fully authorized representative of Warsaw.

¹⁵ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 84-85.

¹⁶ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 86-87.

¹⁷ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 88-89.

to the Poles to dispatch the grand representative (*baş elçi*) to the Habsburg capital was now over and even passed by several days, thus. It was now time for the Poles to declare their clauses. The Polish delegate agreed to respond, but only upon the written delivery of the terms of the Ottomans. Zülfikar posted the letter on April 5.¹⁸ The same day Polish envoy dispatched his king's clauses starting with an annotation at the very beginning, laying down the deliberation of former problems between the Ottomans and the Poles as a pre-condition.¹⁹

1-Previously the Poles used to protect the Kazakhs, while the Ottomans used to protect the Tatars. According to the peace treaty signed in 1489 at the time of Bayezid II, Ottomans were compensating the damage done by the Tatars, whereas the Poles were paying for Kazakh's. As their access to the Black Sea was blocked by the Ottomans, the Kazakhs united with the Tatars and began fighting against the Poles, bringing about great losses and sorrow to the Polish king during the last thirty years. In concordance with Suleyman the Lawgiver's demands from the Poles in the sixteenth century for Tatars' destructive raids to be compensated, now, the Sultan shall compensate the losses of the Poles inflicted by the Kazakh raids.

2-The Turcic people and tribes living in between Özi and Danube shall be transferred to the southern Danube or to Anatolia. The sultan shall stop all his connection and interest in Crimea and on Russian territories as well as on the land between the Danube and Özi Rivers. Wallachia and Moldavia shall be also delivered to the Poles.

3- The protection of Jerusalem shall be returned to the Catholic priests.

4- The Christian subjects shall be allowed to toll church bells, buy land and build new churches. Whoever takes refuge at a church shall be safe.

5- Captives shall be released.

6- Podolia and Kamianets shall be returned to the Polish King with their subjects.

7- The Sultan shall renounce his interests on Ukraine and Kazakhs.²⁰

It was obvious that the desperate condition of the Sultan increased the Poles' appetite to derive excessive benefit from the negotiations. From Zülfikar's point of view, the conditions stipulated by the Poles did not even deserve an answer.²¹ Zülfikar waited until the next meeting with the Poles to reply to their demands and

¹⁸ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 90.

¹⁹ This might be related to the *pişkeş* agreed to be paid by the Polish king after the treaty of Buczacz in 1672, when the Polish King became the vassal of the Sultan.

²⁰ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 92-95.

²¹ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 95.

meanwhile again attempt to take his leave from Vienna as he was not eager to carry on peace talks in the campaign season. In his next letter to the Emperor's delegates Zülfikar declared his desire to hold a last meeting with all of the envoys in Vienna to terminate the negotiations.²² This request sparked a change among the Habsburg's diplomat. For the first time the Habsburgs agreed to meet with Zülfikar without the Polish and Venetian representatives. Zülfikar agreed the offer. On April 13, the Ottoman and Habsburg envoys assembled one more time to listen to each other. Zülfikar stated that it was the sixth month of their presence in Vienna and added, while regular communication between a ruler and his representatives in a peace negotiation should have been a customary, their request to send a messenger to the Sultan was denied and they turned out to be de facto prisoners in Potendorf. Additionally, the campaign season was drawing near and there was always possibility of unpredictable developments happening along the battle fronts, necessitating communication with the Sultan.²³ Zülfikar now had put aside the treaty and focused upon acquiring permission papers to leave. These requests were, however, ignored.

4.5 Zülfikar's Proposal to the Poles to Sign an Independent Treaty

On April 9, Zülfikar had sent a letter to the grand Polish envoy and reminded him that they were waiting for the terms of Polish king. The Polish envoy, who had been performing talks with the Habsburg delegates in Vienna since his arrival in the city, finally met with Zülfikar. Zülfikar began the negotiations by mentioning the friendship between the two states in previous decades. He said that the Sultan had charged the Crimean Khan and his raiders to assist to the Polish King against the

²² Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 97-98

²³ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 99-100.

attacks of the Swedes, Muscovite, and Rakoczi, the king of Transylvania. The Polish envoy was however indifferent to the Ottoman's appeals of past friends. He said that the existence of Tatar raiders in Polish territories did not always originate from friendly motivations and stressed his king's demands for compensation for the damage inflicted by the Tatar raids. Zülfikar, most probably relying on the former friendly relations, attempted putting into practice another strategy, and aimed at isolating Poles from the Habsburgs, by expressing that the Poles could take Podolia and Ukraine only if the Emperor accepts the Sultan's terms. According to Zülfikar, the Holy League treaty benefited much to the Habsburgs, whereas Poles gained nothing. He even offered them a separate peace if they come to the terms. But it proved to be inconclusive.²⁴

On April 12, it was now the Venetians' turn to listen to Zülfikar's answer to their previously delivered terms. The Venetians repeated that they would sign a peace treaty on the condition that each side would keep their own territorial acquisitions. The Venetian envoy stressed that without taking the hold of the castle of Benefşe, strategically the most important defensive castle in Mora; they wouldn't sign a treaty. Zülfikar was amazed that Venice, a small political entity, was expecting the mighty Sultan to hand over castles to them. Zülfikar also refused the clause setting the border in northern Greece over the Bosnian Mountains since a mountainous border could be determined only under the observation of the locals familiar with the geography. Otherwise, such a vague clause would most likely only cause trouble again

²⁴The talks with the Poles had the same denouement. It ended without any decisive conclusion. According to Zülfikar, the only promising aspect of the talks with the Poles was existence of an old Polish noble within the delegates, who, contrary to the grand Polish envoy, seemed positive about an independent peace treaty. Before the Polish delegate set off for Poland, Zülfikar invited this old noble named Mischlevski and recommended him the Polish King to communicate with the Sultan, provided that the King will agree on the clauses of the Sultan. Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 104-107.

One must be reminded again that throughout the negotiations the allies were almost completely convinced about the Sultan's insufficiency to maintain the war. Echoing the Habsburg delegates, the Venetian representative, too, reminded Zülfikar of the Sultan's struggles on the battlefield. He adds that the clauses, however, were still away from satisfying the honor of the Ottoman Empire.²⁵ In the end, talks with the Venetians ended without any agreement and has only been another stage of the fruitless assemblies in Vienna.

4.6 Habsburgs Offer Leaving Balkan Territories

On June 17, Zülfikar Pasha came together with the chancellor, Count Ulrich Kinsky, and general minister Count Ernst Rüdiger Starhemberg in a supposedly confidential meeting. First Zülfikar emphasized that the terms declared until then by the Habsburgs were by no means acceptable and that they would be undoubtedly rejected by the Sultan. Zülfikar asked again to the Emperor's deputies whether any of their clauses were negotiable. For the first time since the beginning of the talks in Vienna one of the parties modified their clauses to less maximistic margins. Kinsky and Starhemberg announced that the Emperor could sacrifice his hereditary rights on the other parts of the Hungarian crown, provided that a peace would be signed on the condition that every castle under the control of the Habsburgs at the time and their territories would remain to the Emperor, including Transylvania and still uncaptured Ottoman castles within the Habsburg territories. To convince Zülfikar, the Habsburg representatives mentioned circumstances of the Ottomans one more time emphasizing that Russia, not yet a member of the Holy League, had started attacks on Crimea, exacerbating the already unfavorable state of the Ottoman

²⁵ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 107-110.

Empire.²⁶ They reminded the combat between the Emperor and the French king was not yet a thorn in the Habsburg's side since it was not only German soldiers but the united forces of the Grand Alliance unified entire against the French King. They told to Zülfikar that if he gains the consent of the Emperor, the Emperor could persuade the Venetians and the Poles to sign the treaty. Unfortunately, its not known precisely what Zülfikar was ordered by the Sultan when he set off for Vienna. Assuming that a treaty would be signed if Zülfikar modified his terms to a more agreeable degree may not be a fallacy. But one more time he ignored everything told by the Habsburgs. The only important outcome of this meeting was issue of the permission papers by the Emperor for a messenger to be sent to Istanbul.²⁷

4.7 Ottoman Courier Mustafa Aga Goes to Edirne

On June 19, the Habsburgs finally gave the permission to the Ottomans to dispatch a courier, Mustafa Aga, to the Sultan. The next day Mustafa Aga departed from Vienna. His journey, although the Habsburgs gave him only fifty days to return, lasted more than four months. On the way, the Habsburg general on the Ottoman front imprisoned Mustafa Aga in Semendire. Zülfikar had ordered Mustafa Aga to post a message from every resting point he stopped. When the papers ceased to arrive, Zülfikar understood that he was detained. At that moment, “the imperial court was assembled for the election of the Emperor's oldest son Joseph as King of

²⁶ Russia's entrance to the war in 1690s exacerbated the situation for the Ottomans. From 1690s on, especially after the consolidation of power in his hand in 1696, Peter the Great, who was to be credited for the transformation of the Russian Tsardom to an Empire, intensified his attacks on the Ottomans, a feature of his westernization policy. For an articulate recent revision of Peter the Great and his westernization policies influence on Central and Eastern European politics, see Simon Dixon, *The Modernization of Russia 1676-1825* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), especially 27-42.

²⁷ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikâr*, 110-114.

the Romans”²⁸ in Augsburg. Zülfikar send a letter to the deputy of the Emperor in Vienna and complained about the situation. Zülfikar noted that Mustafa Aga was imprisoned most likely because the Habsburg general, who was supposedly having difficulty in providing ammunition and provisions to his limited number of troops, did not want the Ottoman courier to notify the Sultan of the dire circumstances on the Habsburg side.²⁹

Mustafa Aga delivered the letter in August. The letter written by Zülfikar shortly gave information about the arrival of the Ottoman delegates at the Habsburg capital and epitomized the course of the negotiations. In the letter, Zülfikar mentioned his own thoughts about why the Emperor might be keeping the Ottoman delegates in Vienna by repeatedly postponing a final talk. He thought that Leopold, having seen his soldiers advance deep into the Balkans with little difficulty, was eager to see whether his armies could progress even deeper into the Ottoman. The letter also included information about the situation on the western front of the Habsburg Empire where decades of French aggression were not at its most fierce level.³⁰

In the letter Zülfikar attached the terms he had laid during the talks with the allies. He, in short, expressed that a possible peace would be an interim one under *uti possidetis* since the Habsburgs purged the possibility of a permanent peace by laying claims on the entire Balkan territories. He also stated that the roads of Temeşvar, Varad, Yanova and Gyula be opened, and that Erdel be restored to its former state as an autonomous principality paying tribute to the Sultan. Also he requested that Kanije still defending itself in western Hungary, be exchanged with an equally important fortress. Venice would keep its acquisitions, while the Sultan

²⁸ Colin Heywood. “Anglo-Dutch,” 64.

²⁹ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 125.

³⁰ Mustafa Güler, *Zülfikar*, 117.

would retain possession of the castle of Benefşe. Furthermore once the peace was signed, the borders in both Bosnia and Mora between Venice and the Ottomans would be determined decisively under observation of the locals. It is also apparent from the letter that Zülfikar was ordered by the Sultan to pursue a peace which included former borders between the empires, which, as emphasized above was impossible from the Habsburg point of view³¹

Mustafa Aga arrived back at Vienna on October 26, 1689, with news about the circumstances on the fronts and renewed instructions. Details of the losses among the Ottoman forces along the Habsburg front discouraged the Ottoman delegation, whereas news of the successful resistance in Crimea and along Polish border as well as the suppression of the revolts in Anatolia and Rumelia counterbalanced their annoyance.³² Indeed, the letter of the Grand vizier had little significance except to boost the Ottoman delegates' confidence by enouncing the successes of the Ottoman armies.³³ The Grand Vizier commenced his words by praising the solid and sapient posture of Zülfikar Pasha against the allies' representatives. He noted that Yeğen Osman Pasha was eliminated in the last winter as well as Güdük Mehmed Pasha, the Beylerbeyi of Sivas, who stormed Anatolia with his brigand troops. The Russian attacks were repulsed, the Venetian fleet was defeated and the Bosnian border was protected.³⁴ The Grand vizier also added that the officials in the Imperial Court showed a preference for Zülfikar to sue for an interim peace under the current conditions. Otherwise, he was ordered to take his leave from Vienna immediately.³⁵

³¹ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 121.

³² Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 127.

³³ Though, to what extent the Ottoman armies were successful was quite arguable.

³⁴ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 128-133.

³⁵ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 133-135.

The letter send by the Grand Vizier to the Emperor's deputy initiated the last series of the communication between the Ottoman and allies delegates. The Grand Vizier asserted in his letter that the Ottoman envoys dispatched to Vienna were plenipotentiary representatives of the Sultan, fully authorized to perform peace talks in his name, and urged the Habsburg deputy to either complete the negotiations within the terms laid down by Zülfikar or send back the Ottoman delegates without further delays.³⁶ After the arrival of Mustafa Aga, Zülfikar Pasha himself had also wrote and attached two letters to the Grand Viziers' and reiterated that the Sultan had not modified his former orders with new ones, thus, he would sign a treaty only under the original clauses set forth earlier.³⁷

On October 29, 1689, Zülfikar replied to the Sultan's letter. Zülfikar's new letter, which included information related to the latest developments in Europe, demonstrates that the Ottomans were not oblivious to the developments in early modern Europe, as argued in chapter II. During the decades the Ottomans ruled in Central Europe they had rarely taken into consideration the possible reactions and outcomes of their operations since their strength remained unchallenged for more than a century. The letter posted to the Sultan by Zülfikar Pasha from Vienna, however, shows that the Ottomans were not blind to the developments and indeed observed and examined the linkages fostered by current political transactions in the Continent. To emphasize again, the political and military strategies of the Ottoman Empire always kept in mind the developments in Europe. For example Zülfikar's letter reported the latest developments on the Habsburg-French border, including a detail from the war zone, though the document was ignorant of the details concerning the circumstances along the Spanish and Dutch frontiers. Furthermore

³⁶ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 135-137.

³⁷ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 137-142.

the letter included such minutia from the Continent as the election of a Venetian noble as the new Pope and the visit of the Russian envoy to the Habsburg court.³⁸

Now it was obvious that as long as both the Sultan and the Emperor did not scale down their expectations and relinquish some of their ambitions - at least for the well-being of their subjects – war would continue. During the following months the Habsburgs' manner towards the Ottoman delegation has turned out to be clearly intended to delay their departure. Habsburgs made him stay so long that he was not an envoy but more of a prisoner from then on. In November, 1689, Kinsky invited Zülfikar to another interlocution. Zülfikar responded that they did not have new terms and would join further negotiations only if the Habsburgs had themselves new terms to be delivered. The next day, Kinsky posted another message and reported the astonishment of Leopold at the insistence of the Ottomans on their original clauses even though the Imperial forces were so successful both in Western and Eastern Europe.

4.8 The Changing Atmosphere of Europe and the Last Attempt for Peace

Before mentioning the Habsburg's last attempt to sign a treaty, one should survey the changing atmosphere in Europe. For the first time since the war between

³⁸ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 142-143. While the war was going on in Hungary, on April 13, 1686, Istanbul accepted an emissary from Russia. Russia wanted to take advantage of the Ottoman's precarious condition by making numerous demands from the Sublime Porte. They wanted forty Russian prisoners to be released, free circulation for Russian merchants, Tatar raids in the Russian Ottoman buffer zone to be prevented, Tuzla castle on Crimea border to be abandoned and permission for participation in the Patriarch rituals in Istanbul. Silahdar, *Silahdar*, Vol II, 240-41. The Sultan agreed to their requests, except the abandonment of the castle. The Russian envoy departed from Istanbul without an agreement. Only the following month, on May 6, 1686 Russia made an agreement with the Poles, which eventually caused Russia to fight the Ottoman Empire. Evgenii V. Anisimov, *The Reforms of Peter the Great: Progress Through Coercion in Russia*, trans. John T. Alexander (Armonk-New York-London: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 44. Apparently, before they become a part of the ongoing warfare, the Czar wanted to evaluate both parties' offers. In the next decade, the trajectory of the war proved the importance of securing the Russian border. The Ottoman bureaucrats and statesmen, however, never discerned this reality in terms of *realpolitik* and preferred fighting against a rising Russia in 1690s, while already fighting with another three enemies.

the Ottomans and the Holy League began, calls for peace had begun to emanate throughout Europe.

In the late summer of 1689, Pope Innocent XI (1676-1689) lost his life. Innocent XI was the most important figure and the mastermind behind the alliance treaty of 1684 between the Empire, Poles and Venetians. He incessantly endeavored to unite Europe within the largest Catholic boundaries and to drive back Turks from Europe. The annexation of Hungary via Imperial armies was going to pave the way for a Catholic Europe by providing the possibility for direct intervention into the existing sectarian discrepancies there. On his part, it was a cogent reason to support the Emperor to regain Hungary. An already known policy of the Ottomans in Central Europe was promoting religious divergences at the expense of Papal interests. Innocent XI lived long enough to enjoy the fall of Belgrade and died in August 1689. In October, Pope Alexander VIII succeeded him. With the new Pope, the trend in Europe towards belligerence with the Turks started to gradually give way to a desire for peace. In a drastic departure from his predecessor, Alexander VIII in his second speech in the presence of the Cardinals and foreign ambassadors stated the following related to the Turkish war and ongoing contentions in Europe:

...The present War with the Turks, in which his Imperial majesty, and the Most Serene State of Venice, with their allies, are engaged. In this we are to consider, whether it be more conducive (conducibile) to the benefit of Christendom, and of the Catholic Church, to continue this War, or to make up a peace with these enemies of our religion, as being content of the Advantages we have already obtained over them. If the first bethought fitting, I here on my part promise to give all the Concurrence to it that lyes (lies) in my power. And if the second be found more reasonable, then conjoint measures must be taken among the allies, that none of them may for their own private advantage, pack up a peace with the Ottomans.³⁹

³⁹ *The speech of this present pope in presence of the cardinals and foreign ambassadors, in his second conclave after his election to the papacy, 1689.* Image 2. Searchable at Early English books Online: <http://eebo.chadwyck.com/search>

Having brought up benefits of a peace with the Turks while currently enjoying an advantageous condition over them, the Pope touched on the warfare between Louis and Leopold. Correspondingly, he emphasized that a compromise with France would also be to the benefit of the German princes, while the acquisition of Hungary would only be a personal gain for the Emperor:

...considering he (Leopold) is in war with an enemy upon the other side, of whom he can gain more, than by a war with France. What this prince gains of the Turks, is properly his own, and is immediately joined to the rest of his hereditary countries. But what he should acquire upon the French side, cannot be his, but would accrew (accrue?) to other Princes of the Empire, that lye (lie) upon the Rhine.⁴⁰

Apparently, after five years of successful campaigns against the Ottomans that engendered their downfall in Europe and, at least for the time being, brought territorial acquisitions even greater than what was conceived in the beginning of the war; the new Pope seemed satisfied. Alexander VIII, indeed, “was friendlier than Innocent XI to the French King” and “declined to find money for the Turkish war.” Moreover, he “affronted Leopold by declining to adopt a single Habsburg nomination in either his first or second ‘honours’ list of new cardinals,” and “Rome was no longer in step with Vienna,” which clearly weakened the Emperor’s hand against the Ottomans.⁴¹

⁴⁰ *The speech of this present pope*, Image 2.

⁴¹ John Stoye, *Marsigli’s*, 100. Pope Innocent XII (1691-1700), the successor of Alexander VIII, carried on the same policy at the Vatican. In his letter to Leopold on December 8, 1691, Innocent XII encouraged the Emperor to seek peace and promised support: “...We are almost ready to expire with the excessive grief and melancholy we are affected with, at the view of all those great calamities, to which they are exposed by this cruel war, which at present afflicts almost all Christendom. And therefore being deeply concerned at the great and piercing clamours (clamors) of so many persons thereby exposed to destruction; and being so very well assured of your Majesties pious inclinations, and of the great desire you have, to promote the advantage of the Christian commonwealth, we have resolved to employ with your Majesty, the same prayer we continually without ceasing address to the Fathers of Mercies, that it would please him to dissipate those dreadful storms from whence so many evils proceed, and to make them give place to a succeeding calm of peace so much desired. We hope that taking into your consideration, the greatness of our sorrow and having a careful regard to the miseries of so many poor people and the dying groans of those that are daily slain in the war, you will be the more confirmed in the inclination you have for peace and that you’ll labour to augment it. As for us, we will put in practice all that we can think of to facilitate to your majesty and to all the rest of the Christian princes, the means of putting in execution a work so useful and so

4.9 The Grand Viziership of Fazil Mustafa Pasha and His Meeting With English Mediator

When the situation on the battlefield seemed so irreparable for the Ottomans, as if to justify Zülfikar's stress on 'the tide of fortunes', another *Köprülü* Grand Vizier gave life to the Sultan's subjects. Fazil Mustafa Pasha, upon the recommendation of the *Şeyhuislam* to the Sultan, became the Grand Vizier in November, 1689. He repealed every extraordinary warfare imposition along with the household taxes laid all over the Empire,⁴² and alleviated the burden on subjects. The next year, he moved from Istanbul in July, 1690, in order to retake the city of Niş. Thanks to the operations of the united Ottoman army⁴³ in upper Danube the enemy's supporting lines were blocked. The city surrendered after twenty-three days, on September 9, 1690. Following the conquest of Niş, the Ottomans marched on Semendire (*Smederevo*) and seized it with little difficulty. Fazil Mustafa Pasha's next goal was capturing Belgrade. While he set out for Belgrade, the Habsburgs were already occupied with the Nine Years' War, which facilitated a less burdensome campaign for the Ottoman army. The conquest of Belgrade was realized with unexpected ease, owing to the explosion of the defender's ammunition depot on the eighth day of the siege, on November 9, 1690. The newly confident next Grand Vizier dispatched an army to Esek, unambiguously setting his sights on Western Hungary. But the heavy rain allowed them only for a four days siege and the army returned to the capital. Support was delivered as far as Temeşvar, which encouraged the Ottomans to

advantageous." *A letter from Pope Innocent XII to the emperour wherein he indeavours to perswade him to a peace*, 1692. Images 1. Searchable at Early English books Online: <http://eebo.chadwyck.com/search>

⁴² Silahdar, *Silahdar*, 483.

⁴³ In this campaign the Ottoman army included Imre Thököly, the son of the Khan of Crimea and the Voivode of Transylvania. Silahdar, *Silahdar*, 518.

restore their control in Transylvania by effectuating the principedom of Thököly there, although it was never restored to its former situation.

While Zülfikar Pasha was still in Vienna, in February 1691 the general of the guarding troops in Belgrade sent a report to Istanbul including the intermediation request of the English and Dutch negotiators. The Grand Vizier gathered the statesmen (*vüzerâ*), the *‘ulemâ*, the Khan as well as *agas* in the army. They concluded that unless the lands occupied following 1683 were returned, war would continue to be the as *de facto* situation between the two sides.

The same year on June 11, 1691, while Fazil Mustafa Pasha was on the way to another campaign he accepted the presence of English negotiator Sir William Hussey in Edirne (*Adrionaple*). Hussey’s existence in Edirne was an extension of the Anglo-Dutch mission outlined earlier. Indeed, the Grand Vizier appeared to be all set for a treaty. He “wanted to know whether Hussey himself had authority from the Emperor to negotiate: in that case he offered to call for ink and paper at once.”⁴⁴ Hussey, who was not authorized to sign a treaty, requested permission for his men to return to Austria to take new instructions. But he asked the Grand Vizier’s thought about a possible peace treaty. Köprülü said “he would judge the possibilities of peace in the theatre of warfare”, and that he was “on his way there at the head of the Sultan’s army.”⁴⁵ The Grand Vizier, who refused signing a treaty, lost his life on the battlefield from a bullet to the forehead received at the battle of Slankamen, on August 19, 1691. In both Istanbul and Vienna, a necessary switch of

⁴⁴ John Stoye, *Marsigli*, 107-108.

⁴⁵ John Stoye, *Marsigli*, 108. Another ground behind the Grand Vizier’s determination to combat might be a secret treaty signed between the Sun King and the Sultan. According to a source referred by Parvey ‘on April 17, 1691 the emperor’s Ambassador to the Hague learned from his British and Dutch counterpart that French letters from Constantinople had been intercepted. They made it clear that the Ambassador of Versailles had offered the Ottomans a treaty obligating the two sides not to conclude peace with the Habsburgs without mutual agreement’, thus, they would be forming another pact against the Holy League. ‘The Porte conceded and the agreement was ratified.’ Parvey, *Habsburgs*, 118.

policies followed the war. For both empires, financing campaigns and feeding soldiers turned out to be heavy burdens. The peace treaty took approximately another decade to be signed, but the battle at Slankamen marked a decrease in the intensity of the combat in Eastern Europe.

4.10 The End of the Talks

The envoys in Vienna never came together again in a scheduled assembly in the Habsburg capital. Zülfikar's coerced presence in Vienna completed its fifteenth month when the Habsburgs finally delivered them permission papers for their departure.⁴⁶ From these days on Zülfikar did not record the dates properly. Most probably at the late summer 1690 they moved to Komorn (*Komárom*), where they would supposedly board a ship and return home. However on the island of Komorn the Ottoman delegate were again detained in order to make one final attempt at a peace treaty. First the Habsburg Cardinal Kollonich and then a private secretary of Leopold paid unexpected visits to the Ottoman envoy in Komorn and declared for the last time that Leopold wished to sign a treaty. Zülfikar stressed that they have already declared their clauses *ad nauseum* and would not negotiate these vital points. While strictly refusing to negotiate, Zülfikar did make one concession and agreed to deliver one last copy of the Ottoman terms.⁴⁷

Zülfikar, in short, stipulated that as long as Transylvania and Croatia were not restored to their former state the Ottomans would refuse to sign the treaty as the new border would have been along the Sava and Danube rivers, leaving the lands in

⁴⁶ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 148-150.

⁴⁷ The Habsburg Cardinal's visit to the Ottoman as a last attempt to sign a treaty might be accepted as a reverberation of the new Pope's calls for a treaty to be concluded. In addition, Ottomans' recovery during 1690 summer probably influenced Habsburgs latest attempt to sign a treaty.

between them to Habsburgs.⁴⁸ Zülfikar was told that he would be notified of the Emperor's answer within ten days, but the tired negotiators would have to wait until mid-February, approximately four months, for the arrival of an answer.

The response letter was an unexpected inquiry into the validity of the Ottoman delegation's letters of credentials. First, in a bold stroke, Kinsky asked whether Zülfikar still had a functioning authorization paper.⁴⁹ Indeed, regardless of whether the Ottomans' letters of credentials were still in force, there no longer existed an atmosphere conducive to negotiations. Zülfikar, as he reports, did not even answer this last letter. As of November 6, 1690, Zülfikar had posted five letters⁵⁰ querying why they were still held on Komorn, although none of these queries helped ameliorate the circumstances. Habsburgs forced the Ottoman delegation to move several other times during the following months but it's not easy to estimate how much time they actually spent at their new residences because he did not record date. They continued to reside in Habsburg lands until January, 1692 but without meeting or communication according to Zülfikar's reports.

The letter on January 19, 1692, from Kinsky had finally ended the captive-like situation of the Sultan's representatives and granted them the permission to leave. The letter accused Zülfikar for refusing to negotiate and bringing the talks to deadlock, although Cardinal Kollonich and Leopold's secretary visited him one last time in order to attempt to restart peace talks. The most remarkable part of the permission letter was the Habsburgs' confession of why they did not allow the

⁴⁸ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 150-152. "...*enhâr-i mezburenin orta yakalarında olan yerler Nemçe'nin elinde ola.*" The clause, although being a vague statement, was probably leaving the Hungarian heart land to the Habsburgs. If so, it meant a major modification in the Sultan's demands at the last point. Since Zülfikar could not move irrespective of his instructions, its likely that fresh instructions brought by Mustafa Aga from Istanbul allowed Zülfikar to renounce Hungary as a last resort and possible farthest point of sacrifice.

⁴⁹ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 155.

⁵⁰ These letters were posted on June 27, July 5, September 15, September 24 and November 6, 1690.

Ottomans to leave. Kinsky declared that they detained them because they wanted to alleviate the public pressure on Vienna if a treaty is not signed. The Ottoman envoys quasi-captivity appeared to be a Habsburg strategy to eradicate their responsibility in case the war continued. After forty months residence in Habsburg land, Zülfikar and Mavrocordato finally made their way back home.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The first question that arises from this inconclusive peace attempt should seek the meaning and motivation behind intransigent and uncompromising manners of both the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. The answer is hidden in the *zeitgeist*. When considered within sovereignty perception of the time, according to which “the single and most distinctive feature of Europe was that almost everywhere wealth and prestige were based on the ownership of land,”¹ early modern monarchs’ devotion to expand their territorial sphere of influence – sometimes to a degree that may only be called blind commitment - should not astonish the historian.

In a very long process that might be expanded well into the mid-twentieth century, gaining new territories and geographically expanding a state’s area of influence and authority has been a major goal of statesmen. In the end, Zülfikar, who unyieldingly followed the order given to him by the Palace, was a character of the early modern world, where valor and resoluteness against enemy- be it on the battlefield or in a peace negotiation – was a usual and respectable way of expressing strategies and policies for every state. At a time when the entire Europe was under pressure of the mostly hyperbolic ambitions of monarchs and rulers of all sizes, one

¹ Black, *The Rise of the European Powers* , 2.

should not be surprised to see that the Ottomans and Habsburgs remained determined to fulfill their aspirations. In Zülfikar's case, a good example to that mindset was his solid opposition to abandoning Transylvania.² Once brought under the Sultan's control, the tributary situation of East European princes should have been maintained. An observation by a contemporary, Paul Rycaut, of Ottoman control on Eastern Europe commences with the following explanation:

The power and puissance of an Empire is not more judged of by the many governors, the rich offices it can dispose of, the multitude of provinces it contains in obedience, and necessity it can impose on other Princes to seek its confederacy...then it is by the many tributaries which to redeem the remainder of their worldly goods, willingly sacrifice the best part to appease his fury, in whose power it is to matter all.³

Nonetheless, the consequence of the Ottoman-Holy League war of 1683-1699 was going to prove one more time that courage and eagerness are not the only prerequisites of success. What at that point astonishes the researcher, which also astonished a myriad number of Ottomanists until today, is Zülfikar's explanation of the reasons behind existing circumstances of the Empire at that time. Zülfikar reiterated time and again during the talks that the Habsburgs were indebted their advantageous position to the turning tides of fortune.⁴ In other words, from Zülfikar's point of view, the tide of fortunes could turn to the Ottomans any time

² The Transylvanian Prince, not only paying an annual 10.000 florins but also providing provisions for the capital whenever necessary, was sitting on his throne with an election subjected to the confirmation of Istanbul. He enjoyed every princely initiative except announcing a war or concluding an alliance, both depending on Istanbul's allowance. In return he was given the protection of the Sultan.

³ Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (1668, Reprinted by Gregg International Publishers Limited, 1972), 60. The strategic importance of the principalities in Eastern Europe is already known to Ottoman historians. Transylvania, along with Moldavia and Walachia, had been playing the role of buffer states between the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburgs and Poland. Transylvania was on the path that goes to the heart of the Habsburg lands. Similarly, Moldavia and Walachia were doorways to the Polish lands for the Ottomans, Kamanietz being a critical defensive point on the outskirts of the Ottoman border that guaranteed Istanbul's control on Eastern Europe, thus, on Poles and the Muscovite. Beyond all, control of these principalities would intimidate the Habsburgs and the Emperor's intervention. Thus, the continuation of Ottoman influence and prestige in the region was going to be secured. Derek McKay and H.M. Scout, *The Rise of the Great Powers*, 73.

⁴ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 35, 38, 48.

and help them recover, at the expense of the Habsburgs this time. This approach of Zülfikar was in a sense an indirect reflection of the contemporary Ottoman chroniclers' failure to understand the actual conditions of the Empire. Indeed, one may argue that it was not simply the tide of fortunes, but several weaknesses of the traditional Ottoman mentality what brought them to the threshold of total downfall, despite keeping pace with European counterparts in military technology and successful adjustment to new standards.⁵

⁵ Recent scholarship has revealed that late into the seventeenth century the Ottoman armies were equipped with the contemporary European military technology. But the strong traditionalism, which was a characteristic of many institutions, thwarted efficient use of existing sources. "The main causes of the weaknesses lay in less efficient system in which these weapons and resources were mobilized, supplied and used. In other words, the backwardness was institutional rather than technological." Gábor Ágoston, "Habsburgs and Ottomans: Defense, Military Change and Shifts in Power," *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22 (1998), 126-141. Indeed, owing to the lessons taken from the long Crete war, the Ottoman navy too was equipped with modern ships and weaponry to the degree that contemporary observers, who witnessed to the fleet modernization programme in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, "made recommendations for improvements along similar lines to contemporary English boatbuilders," and defined Ottomans as still an "credible adversary." Rhoades Murphy, "The Ottoman Resurgence in the Seventeenth Century Mediterranean: The Gamble and its Results," *Mediterranean Historical Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1993), 186-200. It's also known that in the seventeenth century, Ottomans were translating books from European languages, especially on technology. Halil İnalcık, "Osmanlılar'da Batı'dan Kültür Aktarması Üzerine," in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum ve Ekonomi* 2nd ed. (İstanbul: Eren, 1996), 425-430. The preceding debates on the theory of economic and military decline that dominated particularly the seventeenth century Ottoman historiography, today, is thought to have stemmed from misunderstood sources or simply as a sequence of the complaints of Ottoman Palace chronicles written by *vakânüvises* (imperial historians). In his two articles written three decades ago which terminologically gave course to revision of the theoretical setbacks in the seventeenth century Ottoman historiography, Halil İnalcık explained how, in fact, the problematic developments of the seventeenth century Ottoman world were elements of a military, economic, social and bureaucratic accordance process to the time's necessities. Thus, the Ottoman Empire was institutionally flexible. Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700" *Archivum Ottomanicum* VI, (1980), 283-337; Halil İnalcık, "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration" *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (eds) T. Naff and R. Owen, (Carbondale: S. Illinois University Press, 1977), 27-52. In another article examining the Empire's seventeenth century within an analogous dichotomist argument (Rhoads Murphey used the terms 'continuity' and 'discontinuity', whereas Halil İnalcık used 'centralization' and 'decentralization.'), Rhoads Murphey states that in the given era the Ottoman bureaucratic structuring transformed into "a kind of depersonalized institutional monarchy" during "a period of adjustment to new forms of bureaucratic responsibility and accountability." Rhoads Murphey, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory and Practice During the Late Seventeenth Century," *Poetics Today*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer, 1993), 419-443. 425. For a later elaborate revision of the debates on decline theory, see Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1560-1660* (Leiden-New York-Köln: Brill, 1996), 1-21. In regard to current study, a noticeable example to traditional problems of the Ottoman system was related to the commandship in the army. The Habsburg armies fighting with the Ottoman forces since St. Gotthard were led by commanders like Raimondo Montecuccoli, Charles of Lorraine, Louis William of Baden, Ernst Rudiger Starhemberg and Eugene of Savoy (later in 1690s), all of whom were, "as the most glamorous figures of Central Europe," indebted their fame to a great extent to their

Zülfikar, regardless of whether it was an intentional manner to compensate on the table what was lost on the battlefield, illustrated a reflection of the given misapprehension. He insisted on that the allies, too, should have considered that the tide of fortunes may turn against them any time. Therefore, they should have been temperate and reasonable in their demands if they wanted peace.⁶

A similar state of mind may be observed in the intransigence of Leopold. As was stressed during the narration, Leopold, who for two decades from 1660s on focused on his western borders since he perceived Louis XIV as the greatest threat to his territorial integrity, meanwhile preferred complying with the conjuncture against the Ottomans. Because of his occupations in Western Europe, his army's victory on the battlefield in 1663 was followed by a treaty (Vasvar), where the defeated Ottomans have left the table as the advantageous part. Later, during the 1670s, as a repercussion of that treaty, Hungarian malcontents permanently threatened Leopold's sovereignty in the region. In fact, the Emperor's repressive pro-Counter-Reformation administration in the region was an important reason behind the uprisings in Hungary but the Ottoman Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha's support to the rebels fostered the disarray even more. During all these years, he couldn't

successes against the Sultan's armies. R. J. W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550-1700* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 142. Throughout the war, Leopold effectively replaced and transferred his generals from one front to another. Meanwhile, Ottoman commanders including even the *serdar* (commander-in-chief) were continuously harassed by a "battle on a second undeclared front" even when they are in action, which primarily grew out of the "jealousy." This has been an impediment to presence of experienced military commanders when needed. For an elaborate discussion of the issue, see Rhoads Murphey, *Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700* (Padstow: UCL Press, 1999), 134-141. The bickering for positions in the Palace did not cease even at the times of emergency. While the preparations continued for one of the most vital campaigns in the history of the House of Osman, this inherent weakness of the statesmen at the Ottoman Palace emerged one more time. Antagonists of the Grand Vizier plotted against him to seize power by replacing the moribund Süleyman III with the former Sultan Mehmet IV. Having been warned by his agents about the conspiracy, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha forced the ill-conditioned Sultan to move to Edirne, in order to secure the rise of Süleyman's younger brother Ahmet II to the throne, in case Süleyman died during the campaign. Expectedly, the Sultan lost his life towards the end of June. Thanks to the Grand Vizier's precautions, Ahmet II (June 1691 – February 1695) ascended the throne in Edirne. Silahdar, *Silahdar*, Vol 2, 567-569.

⁶ Mustafa Güler. *Zülfikar*, 39.

cope with the situation mainly because he was constantly fighting with Louis. In 1689, when the Ottoman envoy visited Leopold's palace and asked about the possibility of signing a peace treaty or a truce, it was highly predictable that the Emperor would strive to take the biggest share he could take from the Ottomans. There wouldn't be a better opportunity. In the spring of 1689, that is, before Fazil Mustafa Pasha launched the counter-offensive of the Ottomans in following summer, his armies marched as south as Serbia and threatened Bosnia. It seemed that there wasn't any obstacle to his desire to keep all his acquisitions in case he concluded a treaty with the Sultan. Indeed, he had other cogent reasons too. Under his regime, his Empire, although facing continuous menace posed by Louis XIV, entered a route that ended up with the Habsburg hegemony in Europe in the first half of the following century, an era narrated by Austrian historians under titles such as "The second Habsburg Empire"⁷ and "An Empire Evolves and Asserts Itself."⁸ However, Leopold's fault was dismissing his "hereditary enemy as if vanquished forever."⁹ Whatever the circumstances were, it would be a too fantastic idea to expect total failure of an Empire like Ottomans, which had sources that would help to restore the power of the Sultan under the administration of able statesmen. Fazil Mustafa Pasha, although benefiting from Louis's declaration of war, attested this fact only in two years. Colin Heywood epitomized the situation in his following words:

...peace was not attainable in the east...because none of the combatants, more specifically, neither Austria nor the Ottomans, wanted it. At Vienna, Leopold and his advisors were committed to – and believed they could win – a double war on two fronts, and refused until a late stage – 1698 in fact – the proffered Anglo-Dutch mediation. At the Porte and equally war party believed, incorrectly as it turned out, that the lost provinces in Hungary

⁷ Charles Ingaro, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 105.

⁸ Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire*, 54.

⁹ Ivan Parvev, *Habsburgs and Ottomans*, 97.

could eventually be regained, and peace eventually be made on their terms, as long as France remained at war with emperor.¹⁰

Consequently, despite the strengthening pro-peace parties in Europe, the *zeitgeist* of time united with the peculiarities of the interaction between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs and did not let them sign the treaty in 1689. The peace treaty took approximately another decade to be signed.

In addition, according to Heywood, the English mediation during Zülfikar Efendi's presence in Vienna marked the beginning of preservative English policy on the Ottoman Empire.

...the course of English diplomacy during these years retained its significance as marking the initiation of what may be termed as classic mode (redemptive; conservative; preservative) of English foreign policy regarding the Ottoman Empire, a policy which came to its full flowering only in the mid-nineteenth century.¹¹

Indeed, despite the fact that the English had interests in the Levant at that time, in the early 1690s French aggression has been more determinant than any other factor for English to mediate between the Sultan and the Emperor.

A last point should be made in regard to what this mission of Zülfikar in Vienna and the dynamism it triggered in Europe meant within time's diplomatic frame. The study proved one more time that the end of seventeenth century marked a very important stage of the transformation in the European states system of the time. A dense network of diplomatic relations, which accompanied Zülfikar's presence in Vienna, was a peculiarity of the post-Westphalian diplomatic environment in European politics.¹² From the 1650s on, every single political entity in Europe was integrated into this system more than ever, bringing about a truly international network and a political structure, in which the monarchs' strategies and decision-

¹⁰ Colin Heywood, "Work in Progress?: William III," ?

¹¹ Colin Heywood, "An Undiplomatic Anglo-Dutch," 62.

¹² For an articulate discussion, see Jeremy Black, *The Rise of the European Powers*, 1-6.

making were inevitably under sway of the alliances and adversaries that they are a part of. True, alliances and adversaries were always a feature of the inter-monarchial engagements in history. The significance of the 1680s, nonetheless, is the magnified reverberations of the continuously shifting interactions on the political environment of the era, an era that started gaining its peculiarities after the peace of Westphalia. Synchronous involvement of the Ottomans, Habsburgs, Venetians, Poles, English, Dutch, French and Russians (later in 1690s), in this network supports the argument. Zülfikar's visit to Vienna in 1689 was a small but remarkable element of this picture of the late seventeenth century of Europe.

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